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THE 1966 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
At a time when all members of the bar are faced with the
responsibility of defending indigent defendants, it is particularly
important that the rules governing the trial of criminal cases
be stated as fully and clearly as possible. At the same time the
code procedures must be sufficiently flexible to permit trial
judges to adapt them to the special circumstances and necessities
of particular cases. A definite attempt has been made to provide
a statement in the new Code of many rules which are pres-
ently ascertainable only by a careful search of key Supreme
Court decisions and miscellaneous statutes. The filling of such
code gaps and hiatuses, so that the basic procedures are stated
in a single volume, should be of substantial assistance to the
lawyer who is called upon to defend only an occasional criminal
case. Another general objective of the new Code has been to
adapt Louisiana's procedures to those federal requirements
which apply to the states via the fourteenth amendment. There
has also been a consideration of recently developed rules of
other states which are aimed at providing more practical
and fairer trial procedures. At the same time it was important
to retain Louisiana's present basic procedures, and no innovation
was adopted without a careful check of its practicality, and also
of its fairness to the defendant and to the state. One constant
aim was the elimination of rigid technical requirements which
served no other purpose than to trip an inexperienced defense
lawyer or to harass a busy district attorney. It is with these
considerations in mind that this writer will seek to explain the
new procedures, and modifications of existing procedures, in
the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure. In general, no mention
will be made of those code articles in which existing rules are
continued with only minor clarification and reorganization.
TITLE I. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS AND GENERAL POWERS
OF COURTS
The new Code seeks to provide a full statement of basic pro-
cedural rules, and yet there are bound to be points upon which
the Code is silent. In these instances article 3 authorizes the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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court to "proceed in a manner consistent with the spirit of the
provisions of this Code and other applicable statutory and con-
stitutional provisions."1 This discretionary authority of the trial
judge should prove more workable than the old rule which di-
rected the judge to resort to common law procedures to supply
deficiencies in the statute law. 2
Article 15 expresses an important applicability rule. It states
the general rule that the code provisions govern procedures in
district courts. They also govern procedures in city, parish,
juvenile, and family courts "except insofar as a particular pro-
vision is incompatible with the general nature and organization
of, or special procedures established or authorized by law for,
those courts." This stated exception is quite important. Some
procedures of the Code are "incompatible with" the informal
procedures of city courts. Also, many important procedures
of those courts are rather completely set out by special provi-
sions found in Title 13 of the Revised Statutes. For example,
special informal procedures are authorized for traffic violations
bureaus of city courts.3
Time-wise, an important applicability rule is stated in sec-
tion 4 of the statute enacting the Code. The effective date of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was delayed until January 1,
1967. Under clause (1) of this section the Code governs pro-
cedures in all prosecutions instituted on or after the effective
date. Under clause (2) prosecutions pending on that date will
also be governed by the new Code. However, no procedural delay
which has commenced to run will be shortened, and the validity
and legal effect of prior official acts or failures to act will be
unaffected.
Chapter 3 continues a general statement of the inherent
power and authority of the courts.4 Article 18 implements the
courts' authority to adopt local rules covering matters that,
either because of their detailed nature or because of necessary
local variations, are not stated in the law.5 Specific contempt
provisions conform in general with corresponding contempt pro-
1. Accord, UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROC. 61; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b),
2. LA. R.S. 15:0.2 (1950).
3. Id. 13:1900; 13:2485.27; 13:2487.27 and 13:2561.8.
4. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 16 and 17 (1966), restating con-
cepts found in former LA. R.S. 15:10 and 15:11 (1950).
5. Following LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 16 and 17 (1966).
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visions in the Code of Civil Procedure., The division of con-
tempts into two classes, direct and constructive, follows a rather
general pattern. Following the Code of Civil Procedure contempt
procedures will make for uniformity of interpretation and ap-
plication. It is interesting to note that the penalty when an
attorney is judged in direct contempt of court may not exceed
a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for more than
twenty-four hours for the first offense. 7 This limitation is in-
tended to prevent the imposition of heavy penalties during the
heat of trial when heated legal argumentation may cause tempers
to flare.
The Peace Bonds chapter" provides a more complete pro-
cedure and guide for the ordering of peace bonds than was found
in the skimpy provisions of former R.S. 15:27. A survey con-
ducted by the Law Institute among district and city judges
showed opinion to be evenly divided as to the value and utility
of the peace bond. These opinions ranged from characterizing
the peace bond as "a device that merely fanned the flames of
potential trouble" to statements that the peace bond was a very
important means of holding down family or neighborhood strife
and disorder. The peace bond procedures have been revised so
that they may be more effectively used by judges who favor the
peace bond. It should be noted that the issuance of a peace bond
is discretionary, even where the court "determines that there is
just cause to fear that the defendant is about to commit the
threatened offense." 9
TITLE II. DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND ATTORNEY GENERAL
This title continues the sound basic rule that the district
attorney is in complete control of prosecutions in his district,
with full authority to determine "whom, when, and how he shall
prosecute." 10 Article 66 provides the district attorney with a
right to subpoena witnesses to appear before him for question-
ing concerning any offense under investigation. This will pro-
vide a valuable aid in cases where prospective witnesses ignore
the "D. A. Notice," which is a printed form ordering the attend-
ance of the witness at the district attorney's office, but which
6. Id. arts. 221-227.
7. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 25 (1966), taken from LA. R.S.
13:4611 (1950).
8. Id. arts. 26-33.
9. Id. art. 29.
10. Id. art. 61, following former LA. R.S. 15:17 (1950).
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is not enforceable by contempt. This subpoena power will enable
the district attorney to interview key witnesses and procure im-
portant documents without resorting to grand jury proceedings.
TITLE III. THE CORONER AND OTHER OFFICERS
The coroner in Louisiana, unlike the coroner in a number of
states, must be a licensed physician,1 ' and the coroner's authority
and duties are fully and clearly spelled out in the Revised Stat-
utes.12 The only substantial change in the provisions relating
to the coroner is the abolition, in article 101 of the Code, of the
coroner's jury and inquest. The antiquated coroner's inquest,
by which a jury of five laymen made a determination of the
cause of death, served no useful purpose, and its abolition was
supported by recommendations of national studies and by the
unanimous opinion of a number of Louisiana coroners who were
consulted. The coroner himself, being a licensed physician, is
best qualified to conduct investigations into the cause of death.
Under the Code, as under the former law, the coroner has the
authority to summon witnesses and to perform autopsies or
cause them to be performed. 13 His findings are admissible in
evidence as to the cause of death.14
TITLE IV. SEARCH WARRANTS
Mapp v. Ohio,"5 holding that illegally seized evidence is in-
admissible in state as well as federal courts, necessitated a care-
ful review of state search warrant procedures. It is important
that search warrant procedures be clearly stated, to the end
that law enforcement people and courts can be assured that
search warrants are validly issued and that the property sub-
ject to seizure will not be unnecessarily limited.16 Article 161
follows the Federal Rules 17 in broadening the authority which
may be granted by a search warrant. Clause (2), which is aptly
11. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 71.
12. LA. R.S. 33:1557.1-33:1568; 33:1625 (1950), as amended by La. Acts
1966, No. 312.
13. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 102-104 (1966).
14. Id. art. 105.
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. In a preliminary statement to Title IV, LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE (1966), the Reporter concludes, "This Title [on search warrants] is de-
signed to provide law enforcement officers and courts the necessary guide-lines in
this important field. Although an effort has been made to comply with previous
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court, which are at best some-
what.uncertain, no attempt has been made to foresee or to anticipate future
decisions by the court."
17. FED. R. CRiM. P. 41.
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characterized by the Reporter as "in part a crime prevention
measure," applies to the seizure of things used or intended for
use in committing any "offense." The prior article was limited
to instrumentalities for the commission of felonies. Clause (3)
authorizes a warrant to search for "anything" that "may con-
stitute evidence tending to prove the commission of an offense."'18
The source provisions 9 were unduly restrictive in that they only
authorized issuance of warrants for specified purposes and in
enumerated instances.
Article 165 provides a much needed guide as to what a peace
officer can do when he gains access to the premises by virtue of
a search warrant. It specifically grants authority to do certain
things beyond searching for the described property. The officer
may make photographs, lift fingerprints, and seize things which
may constitute evidence although these things are not specifically
described in the warrant. This specific statutory authority pro-
vides a reasonable and much needed aid to law enforcement.
20
TITLE V. ARREST
The procedures for issuance of a warrant of arrest have been
revised so as to fully conform with Louisiana and federal con-
stitutional requirements. Article 202 (2) provides, in conformity
with the ALI Code, the Federal Rules, and many state pro-
cedures,21 that the warrant shall be issued upon a finding of
"probable cause" to believe that the offense alleged in the affi-
davit was committed by the accused. The former rule, which
only required the affidavit of a "credible person" was of doubt-
ful constitutionality, 22 and this might well have been urged as a
means of challenging the admissibility of evidence seized inci-
dental to an arrest. The requirement of "probable cause" has
been easily satisfied in connection with the issuance of federal
warrants or summons to appear. In Jaben v. United States23
18. See Comment, 27 LA. L. RFv. 53 (1966).
19. LA. R.S. 15:42, 15:43 (1950).
20. Accord, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2309 (1953). Extensive authority of
federal peace officers executing search warrants was recognized in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
21. ALI CODE OF CRIM1. PROC. § 2 (1931) ; FED. It. CRIM. P. 4(a), with many
state statutes cited in the Commentary. The most recent enactment is ILL. CODE
CR1m . PROC. § 107-9 (1964).
22. LA. CONST. art. I, § 7, prohibits ;eizure of persons except upon a warrant
issued upon "probable cause."
23. 381 U.S. 214 (1965).
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the court stated, "It simply requires that enough information be
presented to the Commissioner to enable him to make the judg-
ment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently
supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the
criminal process." This information might be included in the
affidavit of the peace officer or other complainant, or might be
obtained by supplemental oral statements.
Article 203 eliminates "John Doe" warrants, which are of
doubtful validity in view of the constitutional requirement that
the person to be seized must be particularly described. 24 The
requirement of clause (3) that an unknown person must be so
described that "he can be identified with reasonable certainty,"
states a practical rule that should satisfy both Louisiana and
federal constitutibnal requirements. It is important to be sure
that warrants of arrest are validly issued; otherwise property
seized incidental to the arrest is illegally seized and inadmissible
in evidence.
Articles 208 through 211 provide for the issuance of a sum-
mons, in lieu of an arrest warrant, where the person charged
with a petty offense is well-established in the community and
can be depended upon to appear for trial in response to the
summons. The summons offers the advantage of avoiding the
hardship and inconvenience involved in arrest and detention,
which may include the added financial burden of furnishing bail.
There is no good reason why an accused should be unnecessarily
subjected to arrest and possible incarceration, prior to his trial
and conviction of a misdemeanor. Then too, the summons saves
time of peace officers and helps relieve the over-crowded condi-
tion of many jails. Extensive use of the summons is recom-
mended by Model Codes and recently enacted rules.2 5 Article 209
applies to the magistrate and authorizes him, in a misdemeanor
case, to issue a summons instead of a warrant of arrest. Article
211 authorizes a peace officer, acting without a warrant in a
misdemeanor case, to give a written summons instead of making
an arrest. In both instances the issuance of the summons is dis-
cretionary. Also, the person issuing the summons must have
"reasonable ground to believe that the person will appear upon
a summons." A warrant of arrest may be issued if the defend-
24. LA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
25. ALI CODE OF CRIAn. PROC. §§ 12-17 (1931) ; FED. R. Caim. P. 4(b) (2)
UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 9.
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ant fails to appear in answer to the summons, or if the mag-
istrate or the peace officer subsequently becomes fearful of non-
appearance.
Arrests by an officer without a warrant are provided for in
article 213, and one change is worthy of special notice. Clause
(3), which was amended by the Senate committee upon a strong
recommendation of law enforcement people and others, author-
izes peace officers to arrest for misdemeanors committed out of
the officer's presence, on reasonable belief that the person to
be arrested committed an offense. The term "offense," which is
substituted for "felony," is broadly defined in the Code to em-
brace both felonies and misdemeanors. 2G This enlarged authority
to arrest for misdemeanors on probable cause should materially
aid peace officers in situations where there is need for a prompt
arrest of a misdemeanant, but where the offense was not com-
mitted in the officer's presence and delay to procure a warrant
would frustrate effective law enforcement.
Article 220 continues the rule that a person must submit
peaceably to a lawful arrest. 27 It also combines existing authori-
zations for the use of force in making the arrest and detention,
and in overcoming any resistance or threatened resistance. 2 It
follows the Uniform Arrest Act formula in providing that the
force employed must be "reasonable. ' 29 This objective reason-
ableness test applies both as to the necessity for and the nature
of the force employed. Reasonableness, rather than actual neces-
sity, is a proper test to impose upon peace officers. It provides
necessary and proper protection for the conscientious officer,
and yet precludes the use of clearly inappropriate force.
The Code of Criminal Procedure Project originally sought'to
provide a statutory statement as to when deadly force might be
employed by an arresting officer. The formula proposed was
considered unsatisfactory by Louisiana law enforcement of-
ficials, and the Senate committee deleted the "deadly force"
articles. 30 This means that the use of deadly force will continue
to depend upon the circumstances of the arrest and will be gov-
erned by general principles expressed in the jurisprudence, as it
26. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 933(1) (1966). Accord, ILL.
CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §107-2(c) (1964).
27. LA. R.S. 15:64 (1950).
28. Id. 15:58, 15:64.
29. UNIFORm, ARREST ACT § 4.
30. Projet arts. 221-223 (1966).
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is in most other states. This jurisprudence is somewhat nebulous,
but it would appear that deadly force will be considered reason-
able force when it appears reasonably necessary to make an
arrest for a felony, but not when used for the sole purpose of
apprehending a misdemeanant or traffic violator.31 The author-
ity to make a lawful arrest includes the overcoming of any
resistance or threatened resistance. In this situation, whether
the arrest is for a felony or a misdemeanor, the arresting officer
is authorized to press forward to make the arrest; and in so
doing he has full rights of self-defense. This includes the right
to use deadly force to protect himself or any other person assist-
ing him from death or great bodily harm.32
Article 228 requires a peace officer to promptly book an
arrested person at the nearest jail or police station. This is the
stage in the proceedings where the accused is fully informed
of his rights, which include the rights to communicate with and
procure counsel and to request a preliminary examination.3
The requirement of "prompt" booking is somewhat more flexible
than the former requirement of "immediate" booking,3 4 and is
better adapted to exceptional cases, such as an arrest during a
riot or in a place where immediate booking is not possible. In
addition to requiring that the officer in charge of the place of
booking shall fully inform the arrested person of his basic rights,
Article 229 requires him to notify the district attorney, within
forty-eight hours, of all persons booked for violations of state
statutes. This provision will make sure that the district attorney
has an opportunity to make a prompt investigation of the case.
It will also facilitate the early release of those not wanted for
prosecution.
TITLE VI. EXTRADITION
Since interstate extradition of persons charged with crime
in one state and found in another involves the cooperation of
two states, the state extraditing and the state of asylum, it is
particularly important to have uniform state procedures. The
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which served as the basis of
Title VI, has been adopted by forty-six states, including Louisi-
ana's neighboring states of Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. In
31. State v. Turner, 190 La. 198, 182 So. 325 (1938).
32. LA. R.S. 14:20, 14:22 (1.950).
33. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 229 (1966).
34. Former LA. R.S. 15:77 (1950).
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following the Uniform Act the procedures and required papers
will generally conform with those of other states from whom or
by whom extradition is sought. Also, some important procedures,
not available under the 1928 Code, have been added. However,
the Uniform Act has not been adopted lock, stock and barrel,
and certain superior features of Louisiana's existing procedures
are retained. For example, Article 262 continues the rule that
extradition is discretionary with the Louisiana governor. Thus
the governor may deny extradition of a criminal who has ef-
fected complete self-rehabilitation and has established himself
as a worthwhile member of the community. Louisiana governors
have not abused this discretion, and the constitutionality of dis-
cretionary extradition was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in Kentucky v. Dennison.35
Article 262 has eliminated the technical and sometimes
troublesome requirement that the person demanded must be a
"fugitive from justice." It simply requires that the person ex-
tradited must be "wanted in that state to be tried for a crime."
It would embrace a criminal who left the demanding state under
compulsion, as where he had been extradited to Louisiana for
trial before his crime in the demanding state was discovered.
It would also cover the offender who was not present in the
demanding state when the crime was committed, as where a shot
was fired across a state line or the offender performed his part
of a crime from outside the state. In these situations the usual
"fugitive from justice" formula would not be met.
The extradition of offenders who have been convicted and
then have escaped from confinement or jumped parole or pro-
bation presents a special problem. In such cases the usual copy
of the indictment or other formal charge would be of little prac-
tical value. Thus clause (2) of article 263 provides a specific
statement of the necessary extradition papers, i.e., a copy of the
judgment or sentence, together with an official statement that
the person sought has escaped from custody or jumped his
parole, as the case may be. This is an area in which inadequacy
of the former extradition law resulted in much uncertainty.
35. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860), holding that the federal government has
no constitutional authority to compel a state to exercise the duty imposed by
art. IV, § 2. cl. 2 of the United States Constitution. The Court recognized the
existence of a duty, but stated that its enforcement depended on the fidelity of
state governors.
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Frequently unnecessary papers were furnished and essential
papers were omitted.
Existing provisions for the extradition hearing, and for com-
mitment to await formal extradition papers are clarified and
continued without major change.36 Extradition hearings, and
temporary commitment proceedings, are conducted by a "judge,"
specially defined in article 261, for extradition purposes, as a
"judge of a district court with criminal jurisdiction." This is
more workable than the former provision 7 which authorized
any "committing magistrate," thus even including a justice of
the peace, to act. It is appropriate, in view of the fact that per-
sons extradited will ordinarily be charged with major felonies,
to have extradition proceedings conducted by district judges who
have exclusive trial jurisdiction in Louisiana felony cases. While
juvenile and family court judges do not have general extradition
jurisdiction, they will retain the special jurisdiction conferred on
them by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law.38
One of the most important provisions of the extradition title
is the adoption of Uniform Act procedures for re-extradition
agreements. Sometimes the criminal wanted by the demanding
state is already convicted or awaiting trial for a crime in the
state of asylum. In this situation extradition will be appropriate
if the crime in the demanding state is a more serious one, but
the state relinquishing the defendant will want assurance that
if he is acquitted in the demanding state he will be returned
without formal extradition proceedings. This is accomplished,
under article 272, by requiring that the governor of the demand-
ing state enter into a re-extradition agreement. In order that
such extraditions will not interfere with local law enforcement,
the district attorney must agree to the surrender of a demanded
criminal where a local prosecution is pending; and, the court of
the conviction must agree to the surrender of "a convicted person
who has not satisfied his sentence. The consent should ordinarily
be given if the crime charged in the demanding state is more
serious than the local offense and a re-extradition agreement is
entered into.
36. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 267 (1966), Rights of accused;
extradition hearing; art. 268, Issues at extradition hearing; art. 269, Arrest prior
to demand for extradition; art. 270, Commitment to await extradition.
37. Former LA. R.S. 15:163 (1950).
38. Id. 13:1641-13:1673. See State v. Smith, 207 La. 735, 21 So. 2d 890
(1945), holding that a subsequently enacted general statute does not supersede
existing' special laws, unless the intent to do so is clearly stated.
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Conversely, article 278 authorizes the Louisiana governor to
enter into re-extradition agreements as a means of procuring
the return of a criminal wanted for trial in this state, but who
is imprisoned or held for trial in another state. In this situation
the Louisiana governor is authorized to agree that if the de-
manded criminal is extradited he will be returned to the other
state on demand of that state's governor without formal extradi-
tion proceedings and at the expense of Louisiana. The authority
to enter into re-extradition agreements will, in such cases, great-
ly facilitate the prompt procurement of persons charged with
major Louisiana crimes and held upon lesser charges in other
states.
TITLE VII. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
Preliminary examination procedures conform with practices
followed in most Louisiana courts. It is not practical, without a
special committing magistrate available, to require the arresting
officer to take the arrested person immediately before a judge
for a preliminary examination. In line with procedures generally
followed, the arrested person must be promptly conducted to
the police station or jail and booked.3 9 At this time he must be
informed by the officer in charge of his rights, which include
his right to a preliminary examination. 40 If a preliminary ex-
amination is requested, either for the purpose of fixing bail or
determining whether there is probable cause to hold the defend-
ant, the officer in charge should deliver him, as promptly as
possible, for a preliminary examination. Implementation of the
defendant's right to a prompt preliminary examination is a
matter which can best be worked out at the local level, rather
than by imposition of a statutory pattern. The conditions in-a
large metropolitan area, for example, will pose different prob-
lems and call for different solutions than those in a rural com-
munity. The problem is an important one which deserves careful
attention and requires full cooperation of courts and law enforce-
ment officials.
The Code rules as to those magistrates having authority to
conduct preliminary examinations, and the scope and procedures
for such examinations, generally conform with existing constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. 41 One of the purposes of the
39. Art. 228.
40. Art. 229.
41. Arts. 291-295.
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preliminary examination is to determine whether there is "prob-
able cause" to charge the accused with the offense for which he
is held. The prior law42 appeared to set out a requirement that
the guilt of the accused must be established at the preliminary
hearing. The article 296 test of "probable cause" clearly states
the issue at the preliminary hearing to be whether a prima facie
case, sufficient to hold the accused for trial, has been established.
The limited scope of the preliminary examination after the
defendant has been indicted is clearly stated by article 296. After
a grand jury has considered the case and returned an indictment
there is no further necessity to determine whether there is
"probable cause" to charge the accused with the offense. The
grand jury finding establishes a sufficient prima facie case of
guilt to justify holding the defendant. 43 Thus, a preliminary
examination held after indictment is limited to the perpetuation
of testimony and the fixing of bail. However, an information
filed by the district attorney is not given the same official
finality as to probable cause, and the court may release the
accused from custody if it determines that the state does not
have a solid prima facie case against him. Such release of a
person against whom an information is pending will be an in-
frequent occurrence, and will merely operate to discharge the
accused from present custody. The district attorney may still,
if he feels that strongly, bring the defendant to trial.44
The provision of article 294 requiring the presence of the
defendant during the examination of witnesses at the pre-
liminary examination and giving him the right to cross-examine
them, is an implementation of the defendant's constitutional
right to be confronted by the witnesses against him.45 Under
article 295 the testimony of witnesses at the preliminary ex-
amination is admissible upon the trial if the witness is, for
various stated reasons, unavailable to testify. If it is probable
that the state may need to use such testimony, the court should
make sure that the accused is afforded the aid of counsel, if
counsel is desired, to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary
hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held, applying
42. Former LA. R.S. 15:155 (1950).
43. Accord, State v. Merrick, 10 La. Ann. 424 (1855).
44. Cf. Art. 386 expressly authorizes the district attorney to file an informa-
tion after discharge of the defendant at a preliminary examination.
45. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. See State v. Chambers, 44 La. Ann. 603, 10 So.
886 (1892).
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a combination of the sixth-amendment right of confrontation
and the "due process" right to counsel, that the right of con-
frontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, and
that the right of cross-examination is not fully satisfied unless
the defendant has the assistance of counsel. 46
The provision, in the first paragraph of article 295, that the
transcript of the defendant's testimony at the preliminary ex-
amination may be used against him at the trial of the case is
well supported by the authorities cited in the comment to that
article; and this preliminary examination testimony of the de-
fendant may be used even though he does not choose to take the
stand and testify at the trial. The constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination must be claimed at the preliminary examina-
tion when the testimony is given.47
TITLE VIII. BAIL
The trend in modern thinking is to make bail procedures as
flexible as possible, thus avoiding unnecessary hardship and bail-
bond costs to the accused, who may ultimately be found innocent
of the crime charged. The bail procedures have, insofar as is
compatible with providing reasonable assurance that the accused
will be in court when the case is called for trial, sought to
ameliorate the oppressive operation of present bail rules.48 The
rules governing the accused's right to bail are fixed in the Lou-
isiana Constitution,4 and the bail provisions have been drafted
in conformity with these constitutional guidelines. Similarly, a
statement of those magistrates having authority to fix bail fol-
lows the existing constitutional pattern.50 Generally, the bail
procedures of the 1928 Code have been clarified and continued.
However, two important changes should serve to help relieve
arrested persons from unnecessary pre-trial detention. Articles
319 and 320 authorize district courts, as well as city courts,51
to fix bail schedules setting bail in advance for misdemeanors
within their respective trial jurisdictions. The bail schedule
serves a very useful purpose in situations where a person is
arrested late at night or on a weekend when no judge is avail-
46. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
47. 58 Am. Jua., 1lWitaesses, § 100 (1948).
48. See Preliminary Statement to Title VIII.
49. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
50. Art. 315; cf. LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 35, 48, 51-53, 83.
51. Former LA. R.S. 15:86.2 (1950).
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able to fix bail. Also, the establishment of a bail schedule will
no logical reason why the bail schedule should only be available
generally result in a saving of much judicial time. There was
where charges were pending in city courts. Where both the dis-
trict court and a city court have jurisdiction to try misdemeanors
under state statutes or parish ordinances, the applicable bail
schedule will be that of the court in which the case is to be
tried. In such situations, the city court bail schedule will prob-
ably be lower since it will be geared to the lower costs in city
courts. While the bail schedule will usually be employed, the
defendant may demand a special bail order,5 2 and the trial court
may increase or reduce the bail at any time.53 In felony cases,
article 316 continues the general rule that "bail must be speci-
fically fixed in each case." If bail in a felony case is given pur-
suant to a general bail order, the bail is ineffective and the de-
fendant may be rearrested. However, if the defendant jumps
bail the invalidity of the bail order will not be a defense to an
action to forfeit and enforce the bail.5 4
Article 336 authorizes the judge to order the defendant's
release "on his personal bail undertaking." In this situation it
will not be necessary for the defendant to purchase a bail bond,
to post cash or other security, or to show that he has property
in the amount of the bond. Where the defendant has strong roots
in the community, either because of his family or his employ-
ment, it is quite unlikely that he will breach his personal bail
obligation; and it may work a great financial hardship upon
the poor but responsible defendant to raise money to pay for a
bail bond or to furnish cash as security. It is hoped that courts
will make wide use, in appropriate cases, of their authority to
release defendants on their personal bail undertaking - to the
end that unnecessary financial hardship may not be imposed on
possibly innocent persons, and our jails and prisons will not be
further overcrowded by the unnecessary incarceration of defend-
ants awaiting trial. Release of a defendant on his own bail under-
taking is in the discretion of the court, and the courts can be
expected to draw the proper line between those defendants who
can reasonably be expected to appear for trial and non-residents
52. Art. 320.
53. Art. 321.
54. Former LA. R.S. 15:92 (1950) gave the surety a windfall in this situa-
tion, by stating the minority rule that a bail bond taken under a general bail
order was "of no effect."
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or irresponsible individuals who will ordinarly need to post a
bail bond or deposit other security in order to insure appearance.
Some special bail procedures have been retained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure Ancillaries chapter of Title 15 of the
Revised Statutes. These include special procedures and bail
limitations where a person is arrested upon a city ordinance vio-
lation charge,55 and the frequently amended and detailed statu-
tory procedures for bail forfeiture. 50
TITLE IX. HABEAS CORPUS
The Code does not specify the courts having authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus, since this authority is granted by
constitutional provisions.5 7 The procedures for habeas corpus
in civil matters are set out in the Code of Civil Procedure, and
the procedures applicable to writs requested from the Supreme
Court will be governed by the rules of that court. In the interest
of uniformity, the habeas corpus procedures of Title IX follow
the general form and style of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Article 352 had continued the existing rule that all habeas
corpus proceedings should be instituted in the parish in which
the petitioner was in custody. This article was amended in the
legislature to provide that where a person is held pursuant to a
court order, the habeas corpus proceedings shall be instituted in
the parish from which the person in custody was sentenced or
committed. This change was made to facilitate the procurement
of witnesses who will be more readily available at the place of
the trial or commitment proceedings. Use of frivolous habeas
corpus petitions as a device to secure a free trip home from
Angola will be minimized by the provision of article 354, which
authorizes the court to refuse to grant clearly unfounded writs.
Article 362, which states the grounds for discharge when a
person is held in custody by virtue of a court order, includes four
new and important grounds. One of these, the sixth-listed
ground, is the basic defense of double jeopardy, which formerly
was only available when urged by a special plea before trial.58
The seventh ground, that the time limitation for the institution
55. LA. R.S. 15:81 (1966), formerly LA. R.S. 15:77.1 (1950). Similarly,
LA. U.S. 15:574.15 is a special provision which was not repealed.
56. LA. R.S. 15:84-15:89 (1966), formerly LA. R.S. 15:99, 15:107-15:109,
15:111, 15:1,12.
57. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
58. State v. Klock, 45 La. Ann. 316, 12 So. 307 (1893).
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of prosecution has run, implements the rule that this defense
can be pleaded at any time.5 9 However, neither double jeopardy
nor time limitations can be urged by habeas corpus if they have
been previously raised. These defenses may be raised before trial
by a motion to quash, or after conviction and before sentence by
a motion in arrest of judgment. If thus raised and the motion
is overruled, the defendant's further remedy is by way of appeal.
The eighth ground complements the Code's extradition pro-
cedures by providing for discharge by habeas corpus when an
arrested fugitive from justice has been denied his right to an
extradition hearing. °
The ninth and last ground, that the petitioner, "was convicted
without due process of law," is quite important. It meets a prob-
lem which all states are facing- the provision of an adequate
post-conviction remedy in state courts for "due process" cases.
The federal decisions make it clear that the federal habeas
corpus power is "as broad as the due process concept itself,"6 '
and is available in any case where the state courts do not pro-
vide a remedy. Clause (9) provides a simple post-conviction
remedy which, if understandingly applied, should reduce the
flood of federal habeas corpus petitions and enable Louisiana to
determine claims of denial of "due process" in its state courts.
"Due process," as applicable to state procedures, is an expand-
ing federal concept. Thus, it was impossible to provide a de-
tailed enumeration of the situations coming within the scope of
ground (9). Guidance as to the line of distinction between denial
of due process situations, and trial irregularities which must be
promptly objected to and then urged by appeal, can be found in
the federal "due process" decisions.6 2 However, the fact that
the concept is sometimes shifting and vague does not preclude
the desirability of seeking to provide "due process" relief through
state, as distinguished from the federal, courts.
TITLE X. INSTITUTING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The methods of instituting criminal prosecutions conform
with controlling constitutional provisions.6 3 Offenses which "may
59. Art. 577.
60. Arts. 267, 268.
61. Comment (i) to article 362, with federal cases cited to illustrate the
great variety and extent of "due process" situations.
62. See note 61 supra.
63. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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be punished by death" can only be charged by a grand jury in-
dictment. Other prosecutions in district courts may be instituted
either by indictment or by an information filed by the district
attorney.64 The definitions and procedures for filing the infor-
mation conform with existing law. Article 386 makes it clear
that the discharge of a defendant after a preliminary examina-
tion, or the refusal of a grand jury to indict the defendant, do
not preclude the state from prosecuting the defendant. The de-
fendant's discharge at the preliminary examination operates to
effect his release from present custody, but does not preclude
his rearrest and trial when a prosecution is subsequently in-
stituted by indictment or information.
Similarly, the second paragraph of the article states the
limited effect of a grand jury's refusal or failure to indict. A
''no true bill" merely means that the evidence submitted did not
establish a sufficient prima facie case to bring the defendant to
trial. The charge may be resubmitted to the same or another
grand jury, although it would be a safer practice to submit a
new bill.6s Also, the district attorney is free to disregard the
grand jury's refusal to indict and may institute the prosecution
by filing an information. This is in conformity with the co-
extensive authority of the district attorney and the grand jury,
in non-capital cases, to determine the propriety of instituting a
criminal prosecution.
TITLE XI. QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION OF GRAND
AND PETIT JURORS
This title, insofar as is practicable, establishes uniform pro-
visions for the qualifications and selection of jurors. The result
is the elimination of separate chapters for Orleans and for other
parishes. Consistency between criminal and civil provisions has
been accomplished by a separate statute revising the provisions
governing the qualifications and selection of jurors for civil
cases.6 7 It would not serve a useful purpose to list the changes
in the general qualifications of jurors, exemptions for jury serv-
ice, and jury commission procedures. The changes are not radi-
64. Art. 382.
65. 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations § 25 (1944).
66. Accord, State v. Ross, 14 La. Ann. 364 (1859) State v. Vincent, 36
La. Ann. 770 (1884).
67. La. Acts 1966, No. 313, amending and re-enacting sections 3041 through
3046, 3051, 3055 and 3101 of Title 13 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.
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cal; the new procedures have sought only to eliminate unneces-
sary detail and provide a clearer guide for jury selection proce-
dures. A study of the code articles and explanatory comments
should precede the appointment and instruction of jury com-
missions. Article 419 continues the sound rule 68 that jury ve-
nires cannot be set aside "unless fraud has been practiced or
some great wrong committed that would work irreparable in-
jury to the defendant." This provision has served well in pre-
venting technical attacks upon jury venires for irregular, but
good faith, jury commission procedures. 9 It cannot be expected
that jury commissioners, who are seldom lawyers, will always
follow the strict letter of the procedures provided.
TITLE XII. THE GRAND JURY
Grand jury procedures, which frequently come under attack
by means of motions to quash the indictments returned, are more
fully stated. Article 433 provides a slightly broader rule as to
persons who may be present during grand jury sessions. It adds
assistant district attorneys, and thus clearly permits their pres-
ence either alone or with the district attorney. Inclusion of "a
person sworn to record" the proceedings and testimony con-
forms with a 1965 amendment to Federal Rule 6(d) and fills a
gap recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court when it held
that the term "stenographer" did not include the operator of
a modern electrical recording device.70 This broadening of the
list of persons permitted to be present during grand jury ses-
sions is important, since an indictment is subject to being
quashed without a showing of prejudice, if an unauthorized per-
son is intentionally present at a meeting of the grand jury.7 1
Article 434 provides a much needed articulation of the extent
of the obligation of secrecy as to information procured and testi-
mony heard at grand jury proceedings. The obligation of se-
crecy, which is imposed on the grand jury and "all other per-
sons present at a grand jury meeting," clearly covers witnesses
who appear before the grand jury. However, this does not pre-
clude a witness who appeared before the grand jury from dis-
cussing his knowledge of the facts of a case with defense coun-
68. Former LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950).
69. See Comment (a) to article 419 for examples of the application of this
provision.
70. State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 199, 94 So. 2d 25, 31 (1957).
71. Ibid. ; accord, United States v. Borys, 169 F. Supp. 366 (Alaska 1959).
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sel and others. Furthermore, the article expressly permits the
witness to discuss his testimony before the grand jury with
those having a legitimate interest in that testimony, i.e., defense
counsel or the district attorney. Thus, while general disclosure
of grand jury information is forbidden, the obligation of se-
crecy does not curtail a defense attorney's discovery of facts
concerning the case.
Two important exceptions to the rule of secrecy are stated.
The first permits the revelation, after indictment, of statutory
irregularities in the proceedings to defense counsel, the district
attorney and the court. This would allow, for example, dis-
closure of the fact that the indictment was not returned by the
required vote or that a meeting was held without a quorum.
The rationale of this exception, which is a broadened codifica-
tion of present jurisprudence,7 2 is that persons under investiga-
tion have a basic right to have the grand jury proceed as speci-
fied by law. A second exception, in conformity with provisions
found in the Evidence chapter of Title 15 of the Revised Stat-
utes, authorizes disclosure of a witness' testimony before the
grand jury to show that he committed perjury.73
Article 442 provides a much needed clarification of the rule
governing evidence to be received by the grand jury. The first
paragraph retains the rule that the defendant has no right to
have his evidence heard by the grand jury, but the grand jury
may receive it. 4 In recognition of the fact that the district
attorney is the legal advisor to the grand jury with the duty
of presenting evidence of crimes, the grand jury is specifically
directed to hear all evidence presented by the district attorney.
75
The 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure categorically stated-
that the grand jury "can receive no other than legal evidence."
(Emphasis added.) 76 Fortunately, this provision was construed
by the Louisiana Supreme Court as no more than a direction
to the grand jury that it should limit its investigations to a
consideration of legal evidence. It could not be employed as
72. State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 94 So. 2d 25 (1957); State v. Kifer, 186
La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937).
73. LA. R.S. 15:471 (1950) permits disclosure of grand jury testimony to
show perjury. Under R.S. 14:124 inconsistent statements made before the grand
jury and at the subsequent trial raise a presumption of perjury.
74. Former LA. R.S. 15:214 (1950), rephrased in conformity with similar
rule stated in ALI CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. § 139 (1930).
75. Accord, ILL. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 112-4(a) (1963).
76. Former LA. R.S. 15:213 (1950).
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a basis for challenging the indictment.7 7 To permit a review
of the evidence considered by the grand jury would destroy the
traditional veil of secrecy which surrounds the proceedings and
testimony presented to the grand jury. Article 442 codifies the
Louisiana jurisprudential rule by employing the term "should"
in the directive to the grand jury to receive only legal evidence.
It also expressly states that no indictment or conviction may
be set aside on the ground that the indictment was based, in
whole or in part, on illegal evidence. 78 The statement that only
legal evidence should be received will, however, serve to guide
the district attorney and the grand jury in a proper perform-
ance of their duties.
TITLE XIII. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
This title seeks to provide a simple and complete guide to
the formulation of indictments - eliminating, insofar as possi-
ble, the "game of chess" aspect of indictment forms.79 In this
regard, article 464, which provides the formula for the so-called
"long form indictment," is particularly significant. This arti-
cle governs the nature and contents of all indictments, except
where the specific forms authorized by article 465 are employed.
Article 227 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure was a source
of considerable difficulty. Its requirement that "the indictment
must state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the offense . . ." (emphasis added) was occasionally interpreted
so as to virtually require a spelling out of the details of the
crime.80 Article 464 of the new Code provides a simpler form
of indictment, wherein only "the essential facts constituting the
offense charged" (emphasis added) need be set forth. It con-
templates that the details of the commission of the alleged crime
are not part of the indictment, but are to be procured through
the bill of particulars. The bill of particulars implements the
defendant's constitutional right to "be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him," 81 but is not subject
to those technical rules of construction which have sometimes
77. State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949).
78. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 138 (1930).
79. The strict construction of indictments in early English law was decried
as a blemish and inconvenience in the law which enabled more offenders to
escape by the over easy ear given to exceptions in indictments than- by their
own innocence. HAE, HISTORY OF PLEAS TO THE CROWN (1st Am. Ed. 1847).
80. See State v. Kelly, 225 La. 495, 73 So. 2d 437 (1954).
81. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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made the long-form indictment a technical trap for the prose-
cution.
Article 464 follows Federal Rule 7(c) in requiring citation
of the statute alleged to have been violated. This added require-
ment for indictments under article 464 is desirable because the
ever-increasing number and complexity of crimes has resulted
in a frequent overlap of criminal statutes under which the
prosecution may be instituted. 2 While the citation requirement
is for the benefit of the defendant, it is not intended as a ground
for invalidating an otherwise sufficient indictment and prosecu-
tionA. 3 Thus, it is expressly stated that an error or omission of
citation will not be grounds for reversal if it did not "mislead
the defendant to his prejudice."
Article 465, "Specific Indictment Forms," retained the short-
form indictment and extended its availability to a number of
other important and well-understood crimes. The specific forms
added were carefully studied by the Law Institute in light of the
Louisiana jurisprudence, and especially Chief Justice Fournet's
thorough and scholarly analysis of the problem in State v.
Straughan.84 It is significant that short forms have been upheld
for crimes that may be committed in a number of ways, pro-
vided they have a well-understood meaning and scope.m The
added specific forms meet this test, being for such crimes as
abortion, prostitution, unauthorized use of movables, negligent
injuring, arson, and kidnapping. 6 Conversely, it was not found
possible to formulate special forms for such multifarious statu-
tory offenses as narcotics violations and gambling.
The chapter on "Special Allegations18 7 provides a clearer
and more complete formula for the stating of many matters
which are essential to indictment forms. Some provisions are
modifications of existing rules and others have been copied from
the very complete American Law Institute Code of Criminal
Procedure. In general, the law remains unchanged, but with
rules that are easier to find and to follow. For example, article
82. "To know the statute nay be as important as to know the facts intended
to be proved." ORFELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 258
(1947).
83. See Advisory Committee note to FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(c).
84. 229 La. 1036, 87 So. 2d 523 (1956); see Comments (a) and (b) to
art. 465.
85. See cases cited in Comment (a), note 84 supra.
86. Title XIII, chapter 2, arts. 466-483.
87. See Comment (b), cited note 84 supra.
19671
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
483 articulates an important distinction as to allegation of prior
convictions. Where an offense, such as petty theft or driving
while intoxicated, is graded according to whether the violator
is a first, second, or subsequent offender, it is necessary to
allege the prior convictions in the indictment. Such an allega-
tion is essential if the defendant is to be convicted as a second or
subsequent offender.88 The first paragraph of article 483, follow-
ing a provision of the 1928 Code,8 9 states the method of charging
such prior convictions. Conversely, prior felony convictions,
which may be the basis of enhanced penalties as a multiple of-
fender, may not be charged in the indictment. To state the de-
fendant's past felony convictions in the indictment for the cur-
rent felony would, according to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
unduly prejudice the jury. 0 In keeping with this sound holding,
the second paragraph states that the indictment shall not allege
a prior conviction unless it "is necessary to fully charge the of-
fense." Thus, the multiple offender charge must be brought by a
separate information after conviction.
Article 484 clarifies the rules governing the bill of particu-
lars - an important device by which the defendant procures
necessary detailed information as to the manner in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed.9 1 It was impossible
to draw set lines as to what particulars the defendant may
demand. Each case rides off on its own peculiar facts and the
matter is one which is not susceptible to precise predetermina-
tion. Under this article Louisiana trial judges will continue to
be guided by certain general principles which emerge from Lou-
isiana's very sound jurisprudence.9 2 An important feature of
article 484 is the fact that it provides a clear statement of the
time for filing a motion for a bill of particulars. The 1928 Code
provided no clear guidelines and the Barnes case simply stated
that the motion must be "timely filed." 93 Under article 484 the
motion may be filed of right within ten days after arraignment,
88. "We are of opinion that it is essential; that the first conviction must be
alleged. It enters into and makes part of the last offense. It is an aggravation
which gives rise to an increase of the punishment." State v. Compagno, 125 La.
669, 671, 51 So. 681, 682 (1910).
89. Former LA. R.S. 15:242 (1950).
90. State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 399, 24 So. 2d 627, 629 (1945).
91. The bill of particulars implements the defendant's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. LA. CoNST.
art. I, § 10.
92. For an analysis of the Louisiana jurisprudence see Comments, 12 LA.
L. REV. 457 (1952), and 24 LA. L. REV. 912 (1964).
93. State v. Barnes, 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890 (1961).
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or before trial if the trial is held earlier. The court may, in its
discretion, permit the motion to be filed until the commence-
ment of trial. In exercising this discretion the court may refuse
to permit the filing of a belated motion if the delay looks like
a dilatory tactic, but should rule liberally if there is an excuse
for the delay, especially if defense counsel is inexperienced in
criminal procedures.
Article 487, which states the rules authorizing amendment
of defective indictments, differentiates between the curing of
formal defects94 and defects of substance. An indictment may
be amended, by court order at any time, to cure formal defects,
imperfections or omissions. The court may order amendment
to cure a defect of substance, such as leaving out an essential
element of the crime charged, 95 before the trial begins. After
the trial has begun, a defect of substance cannot be cured by
amendment and a mistrial must be ordered. It is sacramental
that the entire trial must be held upon an indictment which is
not substantially defective.96 Article 488 authorizes the court
to order the amendment of an indictment or a bill of particu-
lars to conform with the evidence which the state proposes to
submit. When a variance develops between the state's allega-
tions in the indictment or bill of particulars and the testimony
at the trial, arbitrary exclusion of the testimony could lead to
unfortunate results. 97 While the prior law only provided for
amendment of the indictment or information,98 the same prac-
tical considerations call for liberality in the amendment of the
bill of particulars.9 Article 489 protects the defendant from
surprise changes by providing that if an amendment prejudices
the defendant he is entitled to a reasonable continuance. This
right to a continuance conforms with the prior law,'00 and the
94. The first paragraph follows the broad statement of the ALI CODE OF
CRIM. PROC. § 184(1) (1930),. instead of enumerating the myriad forms that
formal defects may take, as was done in former LA. R.S. 15:364 (1950).
95. State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934), where a burglary
indictment failed to allege that "a building" had been burglarized.
96. State v. Williams, 173 La. 1, 136 So. 68 (1931).
97. In State v. Schiro, 143 La. 841, 79 So. 426 (1918), evidence of the alleged
maiming was excluded because it did not correspond with the date charged in
the information. As a result, proof of the crime was impossible and the defend-
ant was acquitted. Later he was charged with the same maiming, but with the
correct date. A plea of double jeopardy was sustained, on the ground that the
defendant had been tried for that maiming-and the defendant went scot free.
98. Former LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
99. Accord, by jurisprudence, State v. Boyd, 162 La. 531, 110 So. 744 (1926).
100. Former LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
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logical lines followed in the Louisiana jurisprudence will still
prevail.' 0 '
Changes made in the procedures after indictment have been
directed toward the elimination of unnecessary legal require-
ments. Article 497 follows the general arrest procedures 10 2 , in
authorizing the judge to issue a summons, in lieu of the more
drastic warrant of arrest, to procure the defendant's presence
in court to answer the charge against him. The old requirement
that the defendant in major felony cases be furnished with a
copy of the indictment and of the jury list'0 3 placed an unneces-
sary burden on courts and sheriffs' offices without any corre-
sponding benefit to the defendant. Thus it has not been con-
tinued in the new code. The defense attorney can easily pro-
cure a copy of the jury list and article 498 provides that all
defendants shall be furnished a copy of the indictment upon
requcst.
TITLE XIV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This title codifies and implements those constitutional "due
process" standards clearly established by the federal decisions,
but it does not attempt to anticipate possible expansions of those
standards. Trial courts should be constantly alert to meet ex-
panding "due process" requirements, and as the pattern be-
comes more clearly settled it may be necessary to adopt statutes
or amend this title so as to further implement the defendant's
right to counsel.
The need for counsel is particularly urgent in capital cases,
and there is strong support for the proposition that "due proc-
ess" requires that every defendant charged with a capital crime
shall be assisted by counsel. 04 Some Louisiana judges, without
any statutory mandate, follow the laudable practice of appoint-
ing counsel for indigent defendants as promptly as possible after
arrest in capital cases. Article 512 recognizes the importance
of mandatory assignment of counsel, and imposes a general duty
101. Compare State v. Singleton, 169 La. 191, 124 So. 824 (1929), where the
defendant was prepared to prove an alibi on the date originally stated; with State
v. Thomas, 214 La. 374, 37 So:2d 841 (1948), where the amendment specified
the particular building burglarized, and this change was not shown to have misled
or prejudiced the defendant.
102. Arts. 208-210.
103. Former LA. R.S. 15:332.1 (1950).
104. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
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on the court to assign counsel before the defendant pleads to
the indictment. Such assignment is automatic in capital cases,
and does not depend upon indigency or require a request by the
defendant. Mandatory appointment of counsel may occasion
some problems where the defendant is antagonistic to law or
lawyers and prefers to conduct his own defense. In this situation
the role of appointed counsel can best be determined by court
order in the individual case and the antagonistic defendant
will usually come to appreciate the help that is provided.
Article 513 continues the Louisiana policy of limiting the
statutory right to state-provided counsel to felony cases, which
include the so-called "relative felonies" punishable with or with-
out hard labor.108 This article does not purport to answer the
question, left unanswered in Gideon v. Wainwright'°6 and only
partially answered by more recent federal cases,107 concerning
the necessity-for court-appointed counsel in serious misdemeanor
cases. About all one can presently state with assurance is that
the indigent defendant's "due process" right to counsel is not
limited to felony cases and has not been extended to lesser mis-
demeanor charges. The time for assignment of court-appointed
counsel is clearly stated, i.e., before the defendant pleads at the
arraignment.108
Any waiver of the indigent defendant's right to counsel must
be intelligently made. Thus, article 513 provides that the court
must inform the unrepresented defendant of his right to coun-
sel, 1° 9 and article 514 requires a minute entry showing either
that the defendant was represented by counsel or that he was
informed of his right to counsel. In this regard, the United
States Supreme Court has meaningfuly stated, in Carnley v.
105. Art. 933(3) defines "felony" as "an offense that may be punished by
death or by imprisonment at hard labor."
106. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
107. For discussion of recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions enforc-
ing the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, see Comment, Some Aspects of
the Right to Counsel, 26 LA. L. REv. 666, 677-78 (1966) ; Comment (a) to Code
art. 513.
108. "The better view is that one needs the advice of counsel on the crucial
question of how to plead. Some judges have taken the position that how one
pleads doesn't matter much because counsel are always free to change a plea
later. However, once a plea of guilty has been entered, a very damaging admis-
sion has been made, and counsel may be understandably reluctant to try to undo
the harm later by changing the plea. State courts are practically unanimous
in agreement that the right to counsel accrues at the arraignment." FELLMAN,
THE DEFENDANT'S RiGHTS 123 (1958).
109. Accord, FED. R. CRIM. P. 44; N.J. RULES 1:12-9(a); ALI CODE OF
CRIM. Paoc. § 203 (1930).
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Cochran,110 that "the record must show, or there must be an alle-
gation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
Anything less is not a waiver." Similarly, and in conformity
with a 1964 statute, the court must always appoint counsel for
a defendant whose mental capacity to proceed is in issue. Such
a person may not be qualified to determine his need for counsel
or capable of procuring counsel.'
The indigent defendant's right to counsel to prosecute his
appeal was recognized as having full "equal protection ' status
in Douglas v. California.112 Unfortunately, the Douglas decision
provided no guidance as to what procedure might be adopted
to screen out frivolous and obviously unfounded appeals, where
the appointment of an attorney would be an unnecessary burden
on the bar and a "useless gesture.' '113 In view of this practical
difficulty, the code followed existing Louisiana procedures; no
statutory duty is imposed, but the appointed attorney who rep-
resented the defendant at the trial usually continues to repre-
sent him on appeal, often at considerable personal expense and
sacrifice. Such appellate representation, in meritorious cases,
has come to be recognized as part of the obligation of the law-
yer who represented the defendant at the trial.1 4
Similarly, the code has not attempted to anticipate the ulti-
mate effects of Miranda v. Arizona, 15 where the United States
Supreme Court held that the defendant must be offered the
benefit of counsel when questioned by police, as an implementa-
tion of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
This is a problem that was not susceptible of statutory formula-
tion when the code was adopted, and it may be a matter which
can best be solved at a local level.
TITLE XV. MOTION TO QUASH
Article 531 adopts a procedure, recommended by the Ameri-
110. 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) ; accord, State v. Youchunas, 187 La. 281, 174
So. 356 (1937).
111. Art. 643; accord, former LA. R.S. 15:271 (1950).
112. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), where Justice Douglas stated that when the
appeal of an indigent defendant is decided without the benefit of counsel, "an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."
113. Id. at 359. Justice Clark, in a well-reasoned and vigorous dissent, cited
imposing statistics showing that 96% of appeals in forma pauperis in federal
courts were frivolous.
114. State v. Graves, 246 La. 460, 467, 165 So. 2d 285, 288 (1964).
'115. 384 U.S. 436 (1966), noted, 27 LA. L. REV. 87 (1966).
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can Law Institute,"" whereby the all-inclusive motion to quash
is substituted for numerous separate devices which have been
employed to raise preliminary defenses. The grounds, covering
all forms of defects in the proceedings, are fully stated in arti-
cles 532 through 534. There had been some uncertainty as to
the proper device for urging some of those defenses under the
multi-labeled pleas of the 1928 code. For example, matters
raised by demurrer could also be urged by a motion to quash.
However, the converse was not true, and it was fatal to the
defendant's objection when he mistakenly filed a demurrer for
an objection which did not appear on the face of the indict-
ment. 11
7
The grounds for the motion to quash cover a wide variety
of defenses, some of which were inadequately articulated in the
old code or found only in the jurisprudence. These grounds
should be studied. Preliminary motions which do not constitute
"pleas or defenses" are governed by other titles of the code.
Examples of such motions are motions for a bill of particulars,
for change of venue, for a continuance, or for recusation of the
trial judge. The defense of mental incapacity to proceed, which
may be raised before or during the trial, is expressly excepted
from the general coverage of article 531, and is to be handled
in conformity with special procedures fully set forth in Title
XXI, Insanity Proceedings.
The time for filing motions to quash was confusingly stated
in three overlapping articles of the 1928 code, 118 and resort to
the jurisprudence was frequently necessary to ascertain the rule
to be followed. 119 Under article 535 the time for filing a motion
to quash is dependent upon the ground upon which the motion
is based, and these grounds are fully spelled out. Paragraph A
embraces those grounds which are so fundamental that they
are not waived by failure to file a motion to quash, and may be
urged for the first time after conviction. Examples of these
grounds are the unconstitutionality of the statute under which
the prosecution was brought, double jeopardy, time limitation
upon the institution of prosecution, and lack of jurisdiction. In
116. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 209, 210 (1930).
117. State v. Aenspacker, 130 La. 717, 58 So. 520 (1912).
118. Former LA. U.S. 15:202, 15:265, 15:284 (1950).
119. See the Supreme Court's construction of R.S. 15:202 in State v.
Smothers, 168 La. 1099, 123 So. 781 (1929), and State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24,
14 So. 2d 873 (1943).
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these instances it is best to get the issue settled before trial, if
possible. Thus a liberal rule is stated and the motion to quash
may be filed of right at any time before the commencement of
the trial. Trial procedure is expedited by the trial judge's spe-
cific authority to defer the hearing on the motion to quash until
the end of the trial.
Paragraph B includes important grounds, but grounds which
cannot generally be urged after conviction. It covers expiration
of the time limitation upon the commencement of trial, a rule
implementing the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial. It also embraces alleged irregularities in the selection of
jury venires. A motion to quash on these grounds may be filed
as of right at least three judicial days before commencement
of the trial; it may be filed with permission of the court during
the three-day period immediately preceding the trial. Again,
the hearing may be deferred in the interest of trial expediency.
The non-enumerated "other grounds" embraced by para-
graph C are formal defects which are waived if not promptly
urged. They include, among other things, such defects as mis-
joinder or duplicity, failure to properly file or authenticate
the indictment, and improper venue. These may be filed, as of
right "within ten days after arraignment, or before commence-
ment of the trial, whichever is earlier." The court may permit
the motion between the expiration of the ten-day period and the
beginning of the trial. This discretion will enable the trial judge
to help an inexperienced defense counsel who has an excuse
for his belated motion.
Article 538, which is based largely on Federal Rule 12(5),
specifies the effect of sustaining a motion to quash. If the
ground is invalidity of the statute upon which the charge is
based, double jeopardy, time limitations, or the court's lack of
jurisdiction, the defendant will be discharged as to the present
charge when the motion is sustained. When the motion to quash
is based upon defective grand jury proceedings, a defectively
framed indictment, or other defects which merely vitiate the
particular charge, the court is authorized to order the defend-
ant continued in custody or on bail pending the filing of a new
or corrected indictment.
TITLE XVI. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEAS
This title generally conforms with prior code provisions and
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the Louisiana jurisprudence. It should be noted that article
552, listing the pleas at the arraignment, includes two changes.
The plea of double jeopardy is no longer listed as a plea to the
merits, but is one of the grounds for the motion to quash. 120
There was no sound reason for treating double jeopardy as a
plea to the merits, when other fundamental bars to trial that
are determined by the court, such as time limitations and lack
of jurisdiction, are raised by the motion to quash. The dual
plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity" con-
forms more clearly with present procedures whereby the insan-
ity defense, when pleaded, is tried concurrently with those de-
fenses which are generally available upon a simple "not guilty"
plea.12
1
The method of pleading is fully set forth in article 553,
which continues the requirement that a defendant charged with
a felony must plead in person. 122 In misdemeanor cases, liberal
and practical pleading rules are stated. In these cases the
defendant may always plead "not guilty" through counsel.
Whether a "guilty" plea shall be received in the absence-of the
defendant is a matter left to the discretion of the judge, who
may have reason to require the defendant's presence in court
when the plea is received and the sentence imposed. It is nor-
mal for a corporate defendant to plead through counsel in all
cases, and this is specifically authorized. 123
Existing safeguards and limitations upon the receiving of
"guilty" pleas are continued in articles 557 through 560. Arti-
cle 556 adds a further precautionary requirement that where
a defendant is not represented by counsel in a felony case, the
court shall not accept a guilty plea "without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the na-
ture of the charge.' 24 The article emphasizes and reiterates the
court's duty in protecting the unrepresented defendant against
120. Art. 532(6).
121. These procedures, which were formerly only determined by a careful
study of the jurisprudence, are fully stated in chapter 2 of Title XXI, Insanity
Proceedings. See art. 651, Comment (b) (1966).
122. Former LA. R.S. 15:257 (1950).
123. Accord, ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. § 223 (1930). See also, the pro-
vision in LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 554 (1966) to the effect that
where a corporate defendant fails to appear a plea of "not guilty" shall be
entered.
124. The general requirement is based upon FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 and follows
ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 22.4 (1930) in limiting its application to cases where
the defendant is not represented by counsel.
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coerced or misunderstood guilty pleas, but is stated in broad,
non-technical language so that it will not serve as a device for
beclouding the validity of sentences imposed after pleas of
guilty.125
The trial court's discretion as to whether a plea of guilty
may be withdrawn 126 has been continued in article 559, but
with the added requirement that the withdrawal of the plea
must be made "before sentence." 127 Existing jurisprudence, to
the effect that an improper refusal to permit the withdrawal of
the guilty plea is reversible error 128 will still be fully effective.
A special right to relief, where the defendant has been rushed
into a plea of guilty within forty-eight hours after his arrest,
is continued in the second paragraph of article 559.129 The
sound rule that a withdrawn guilty plea shall not be admissible
at the trial,130 is broadly stated so as to clearly apply to any plea
of guilty that is subsequently withdrawn or set aside.
TITLE XVII. TIME LIMITATIONS
This title embraces, without change, the completely new sys-
tem of time limitations on criminal prosecutions which was en-
acted in 1960. l 31 The 1960 time limitations law had been drafted
by the Louisiana State Law Institute as part of the Code of
Criminal Procedure revision, but was enacted prior to the com-
pletion of the Code, in order to meet an urgent need for relief
in this confused area of the law.
TITLE XVIII. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Article 592 eliminates an unnecessary distinction between
jury and judge trial cases and provides that in both situations
jeopardy begins when the first witness is sworn at the trial on
the merits.
Under the 1928 code provisions, double jeopardy could only
be urged by a special plea, which was urged, tried, and disposed
125. See Comment (c) to art. 556.
126. Former LA. R.S. 15:266 (1950).
127. This added requirement follows ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 230 (1930)
and is well supported by the cases and statutes cited in the commentary to § 230.
128. See Comment (a) to art. 559 for citation of Louisiana cases.
129. Based upon former LA. R.S. 15:266.1 (1950).
130. The basis of this rule is set out in Comment (d) to art. 559.
131. La. Acts 1960, No. 25, enacting former LA. R.S. 15:7.1-15:7.13 (Supp.
1960).
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of before the trial.132 Article 594, in recognition of the funda-
mental nature of this defense, 133 provid'es that double jeopardy
"may be raised at any time, but only once." Thus it may be
urged before trial by a motion to quash, 34 with a bill of excep-
tions reserved if the motion is overruled. If not previously
urged, it may be raised after conviction by a motion in arrest
of judgment 135 or by a writ of habeas corpus.136 In all situations,
as under the former law, 137 the defense is tried by the court
alone.
Article 596, which covers the identity of offenses concept,
includes the "identical with or different grades of the same of-
fense" formula of article 279 of the 1928 code. However, it
makes it abundantly clear that double jeopardy is not limited
by responsive verdict restrictions.
Clause (2) of the article precludes multiple prosecutions for
continuous offenses. For example, possession of stolen goods
or narcotics may continue over a considerable period of time
or in several parishes. Yet, there has only been one crime and
only one criminal prosecution is proper.
Article 598 codifies the Harville3 8 rule that conviction of a
lesser included offense constitutes an implied acquittal of the
greater offense charged; and on a new trial the defendant can
be tried only for the offense for which he was convicted. The
second sentence carries the Harville rule a logical step further
and provides that when a jury returns a verdict of "guilty with-
out capital punishment," a subsequent new trial cannot result
in a death sentence.
TITLE XIX. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Liberal jurisdiction and venue provisions, and an imple-
menting constitutional amendment, were adopted upon the rec-
ommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute in 1962.139
These provisions, and other existing jurisdiction and venue rules,
132. Former LA. R.S. 15:281 (1950).
133. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
134. Art. 532(6).
135. Art. 859(6).
136. Art. 362(6).
137. Former LA. R.S. 15:282 (1950).
138. State v. Harville, 171 La. 256, 130 So. 348 (1930), where the defendant
was tried for murder and convicted of manslaughter. Upon a new trial the de-
fendant was only subject to trial for manslaughter.
139. Amendments of LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9, and LA. R.S. 15:13 (1950).
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are continued without change in articles 611 through 614. A
special provision, which deals with venue in non-support cases,
was placed in the Code of Criminal Procedure Ancillaries chap-
ter of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes. 140 The method of rais-
ing improper venue is clarified by article 615, but is stated in
conformity with existing constitutional rules. In general, im-
proper venue may be raised before trial by a motion to quash,
and then is triable by the judge alone. The right of the defend-
ant to again raise the issue at the trial on the merits before the
jury141 is also preserved.
TITLE XX. CHANGE OF VENUE
The change of venue rules and procedures are in general
conformity with the 1928 code provisions. Article 623, however,
affords a much needed liberalization, by providing that when a
change of venue is granted the case shall be transferred "to
another parish." The former limitation of transfer to a court
of an adjoining parish or district proved completely unworkable
in cases like State v. Rideau,'42 where prejudice existed in the
entire area covered by the telecast of the defendant's confes-
sion, and transfer of the case to a more distant section of the
state was ordered by the Louisiana Supreme Court to assure
the defendant a fair trial.143 Also, the former limitation to a
single change of venue-44 has been deleted. Such an arbitrary
limitation was so out of keeping with the defendant's right to
a fair trial that it could, in an extreme situation, have consti-
tuted a denial of "due process."
TITLE XXI. INSANITY PROCEEDINGS
The procedures for administering the defenses of inshnity
at the time of the crime (a defense on the merits) and present
insanity (a bar to present trial) were confusingly and inade-
quately stated in the cumbersome and much amended provisions
of articles 267 through 269 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Many important rules were only ascertainable by an
extensive study of the Louisiana jurisprudence. Title XXI
140. LA. R.S. 15:191 (Supp. 1966), formerly LA. R.S. 15:16.1 (1950).
141. See cases cited in Comment (a) (2) under art. 615.
142. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
143. State v. Rideau, 246 La. 451, 165 So. 2d 282 (1964).
144. Former LA. R.S. 15:294 (1950), providing that a second change of
venue could not be had "under any pretense whatsoever."
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builds upon existing statutory procedures by codifying a number
of sound rules which have been established by decisions of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. It further implements those proce-
dures by the addition of supplementary provisions suggested in
uart by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.145
The two insanity defenses are separately treated. Chapter 1
provides procedures for raising and determining the defense
of mental incapacity to proceed, which may be urged at any
time, 140 but is usually urged and disposed of prior to the actual
trial of the case. The test of article 641 conforms with the
prior law 147 and is a test that has been almost universally
adopted. The issue is whether "as a result of mental disease or
defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." The
procedures for raising this defense are largely unchanged.
Under article 642, mental incapacity to proceed may be raised
at any time, even during trial; and it may be urged by the de-
fense, the district attorney, or the court. The ordering of a men-
tal examination as to a defendant's capacity to proceed rests in
the sound discretion of the court. Thus article 643 continues the
rule that the court must have "reasonable ground to doubt the
defendant's mental capacity to proceed."
Article 644 provides a more flexible procedure as to the com-
position of a sanity commission appointed to examine and re-
port upon the defendant's present mental condition. Under the
former law the commission was composed of two members, with
the coroner a mandatory member. This latter requirement,
which was unique to Louisiana, was difficult to justify in view
of the fact that coroners usually have very little training in psy-
chiatry. Under the new code, determination of the composition
of the sanity commission rests entirely with the court, which
is authorized to appoint a commission of from one to three "phy-
sicians" with at least three years' practical experience. It is
quite probable that the judge will appoint psychiatrists where
they are available; but there is nothing to prevent appointment
of the coroner or some general practitioner, where the judge
has special confidence in the advice of these men or psychiatrists
145. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.02-4.09 (1962).
146. Art. 642.
147. Former LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
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are not readily available. The determination of mental capacity
to proceed follows existing procedures. 148
Article 648, in conformity with the usual disposition of such
cases, provides that a mentally incapacitated defendant shall be
committed to a state mental institution for as long as such in-
capacity continues. This may result in great hardship where
a defendant charged with a non-violent offense is committed
for a long period pending a finding of present capacity to pro-
ceed. In such a situation probation is authorized upon a finding
that the defendant is not being helped by continued custody in
the mental institution and that he may be released without dan-
ger. Probation can only be granted upon recommendation of the
superintendent of the mental institution, and the court should
impose conditions designed to make sure that the defendant will
not create a problem in the community to which he is returned.
Article 649 provides more complete procedures for subse-
quent determination of whether a committed defendant has re-
gained capacity to stand trial. The subsequent hearing as to
present capacity will usually be instigated by a report by the
superintendent of the mental institution to which the defendant
was committed, but present capacity may also be urged by the
district attorney or the defense. In all instances the trial judge
decides the issue of present capacity, and flexible procedures
are desirable. In making his determination the judge may de-
pend upon the report and recommendation of the superintend-
ent of the mental institution, since this is certainly a source
of first-hand, complete information. Examinations and reports
by the staff of the mental institution may be ordered when the
district attorney or the defense applies to have the proceedings
resumed. On the other hand, there will be many cases where
appointment of an independent sanity commission will be ad-
visable - taking into consideration such factors as the avail-
ability of staff psychiatrists to make complete examinations and
to testify at the sanity hearing, and the particular court's experi-
ence as to the relative thoroughness and value of institutional
versus independent examinations and reports. It should be noted
that the re-determination of present capacity must be at a con-
tradictory hearing, where both the defense and the district at-
torney are given a full opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine any witnesses called.
148. Arts. 645-646.
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Chapter 2 provides procedures for determination of the basic
defense on the merits of insanity at the time of the offense. 149
These procedures were inadequately stated in the 1928 Code of
Criminal Procedure, and subsequent amendatory statutes have
resulted in obfuscation rather than clarification. A true picture
can only be had by a careful study of key Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions, and the attorney who is not familiar with such
landmark decisions as Gunter, Dowdy and Watts is almost as
confused as the defendant he represents. Article 651 codifies
the current practice and procedure, as established by the Gun-
ter'5 0 and Dowdy'5 ' decisions. Under a simple plea of "not
guilty" insanity is not in issue, and evidence of insanity or men-
tal defect at the time of the crime is inadmissible. Under a com-
bined plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity"
all defenses going to the defendant's guilt or innocence, includ-
ing the special defense of insanity at the time of the crime, are
tried concurrently by the jury. The reason for requiring a spe-
cial plea of insanity, as distinguished from the old common-law
procedure of permitting the insanity defense under a general
"not guilty" plea, is that it provides advance notice to the court
and the district attorney that insanity will be urged at the
trial.1 52 This enables the court to appoint a sanity commission
in advance of the trial.
An important related question concerns the time within
which a defendant may change from a simple "not guilty" plea
where insanity is not in issue, to a dual plea which raises insan-
ity along with other defenses on the merits. The much amended
provisions of the 1928 code provided no real guidelines, and the
matter was apparently controlled by State v. Watts,153 where the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in
refusing to entertain the defendant's plea of insanity, even
though it was filed just before the case was called for trial,
149. This defense is a matter of substantive criminal law which is stated in
art. 14 of the 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code. "If the circumstances indicate that
because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question,
the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility." (Emphasis added.)
150. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305 (1945).
151. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So. 2d 496 (1950) ; see Comment (b)
to art. 651.
152. Accord, ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03 (1962) : "(2) Evidence of mental
disease or defect excluding responsibility is not admissible unless the defendant,
at the time of entering his plea of not guilty or within ten days thereafter or
at such later time as the Court may for good cause permit, files a written notice
of his purpose to rely on such defense."
153. 171 La. 618, 131 So. 729 (1930).
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would result in delaying the trial until the next term of court,
and was probably filed late as a dilatory tactic. The rule of
the Watts case had little support in practicality or in the law
of Louisiana or other states. Article 561 provides a definite
rule which follows the procedure adopted in most modern in-
sanity statutes and is consistent with the analogous notice pro-
vision of the ALI Model Penal Code.154 The ten-day period after
arraignment to change to an insanity plea, as of right, provides
a brief additional period for counsel to assess the advisability of
urging a defense of insanity. Added protection against inad-
vertent loss of a good insanity defense is contained in the pro-
vision which authorizes the court, for good cause shown, to per-
mit a change of plea at any time before the commencement of
trial. Delays resulting from inexperience of defense counsel
and other hardship cases will come within this provision. Other-
wise, failure to urge the insanity defense within ten days after
the arraignment, as in Watts, will justify the court's refusal to
permit the belated change of plea.
When insanity is pleaded as a defense, a verdict of "not guilty
by reason of insanity" is responsive,155 and the court shall charge
the jury that if it acquits the defendant on that ground it must
so specify in its verdict.156 Article 654 fully states, for the first
time, the procedures after an acquittal on the ground of insanity.
In capital cases, as under the existing law, the acquitted defend-
ant is automatically committed to a proper mental institution.
In non-capital felony cases provision is made for a prompt deter-
mination, by a contradictory hearing as part of the criminal
proceedings, of the question of whether the defendant should
be committed or may safely be discharged completely or released
on probation. Under the former code, no provision was made
for this situation and the only protection against a still danger-
ous defendant was a civil commitment procedure, brought by
the district attorney under the mental health laws. 1 57
The test for continued custody of a defendant who has been
committed after an acquittal on the ground of insanity is dan-
gerousness of the defendant. This test conforms with the 1960
Louisiana statute for commitment of capital defendants. 158 In
154. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §4.03(2) (1962).
155. Art. 816.
156. Art. 805.
157. LA. R.S. 28:59 (1950).
158. Id. 15:270 (Supp. 1960).
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support of a similar ALI Model Penal Code provision, the Com-
ment states that "it seems preferable to make dangerousness the
criterion for continued custody, rather than to provide that the
committed person may be discharged or released when restored
to sanity as defined by the mental hygiene laws. Although his
mental disease may have greatly improved, such a person may
still be dangerous because of factors in his personality and back-
ground other than mental disease. Also, such a standard pro-
vides a possible means for the control of the occasional defend-
ant who may be quite dangerous but who successfully feigned
mental disease to gain an acquittal."' 1 9
The acquitted forcible felon, especially the insane killer or
rapist, will seldom regain mental normality to such an extent
as to render his release safe to society. However, procedures for
making such a determination are provided, 160 following the gen-
eral pattern of the complete and carefully formulated ALI Model
Penal Code procedures, 6' and place the responsibility for de-
ciding whether the defendant may be safely released upon the
trial judge. In making this determination he may, as in the
determination of mental capacity to proceed, rely upon a report
from the superintendent of the mental institution or appoint an
independent sanity commission. The release procedures are very
flexible, authorizing the court to act upon the basis of reports
filed or to hold a full contradictory hearing. If a hearing is held,
the burden of proof is on the committed person to prove that
his discharge or release on probation would be "without danger
to others or to himself."'
6 2
A 1966 amendment to the mental health laws 1  authorizes
the superintendent of a mental institution, on a certificate from
two physicians that no harm will result from his discharge, to
order the release of a committed person. This statute will not
apply to commitments incidental to criminal proceedings, where
release from the mental institution must always be by court
order. Section 6 of the statute enacting the Code of Criminal
Procedure1 64 repudiates any possible artificial rule of construc-
tion to the contrary and states that the new code procedures
159. ALI MAODEL PENAL CODE, tentative draft no. 4, § 4.08, Comment 2 (1955).
160. Arts. 654-657.
161. ALI MODEL FENAL CODE § 4.08 (1962).
162. Art. 657.
163. LA. R.S. 28:96.1 (Supp. 1966).
164. La. Acts 1966, No. 310.
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shall prevail over any conflicting statutory provision enacted at
the 1966 regular legislative session "regardless of which act is
adopted later or signed later by the Governor." The legislative
intention that special Code of Criminal Procedure provisions
were not to be superseded by the mental health law amendment
was further shown by the fact that that amendatory statute
purported to expressly continue the applicability of the then
effective Code of Criminal Procedure rules governing insanity
proceedings. 16 5
TITLE XXII. RECUSATION OF JUDGES AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
The procedures for recusation of judges, in the interest of
promoting uniformity, follow the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure,
with such adaptations as are necessary to adjust to the special
differences in criminal cases. The most important ground for
recusation, as stated in article 671, is ground (1). It continues
the rule that interest in the cause is a ground for recusation,
and adds the much needed provision that bias or prejudice shall
also be a ground for recusation. This expansion is in line with
the basic purpose of recusation procedures, i.e., to protect the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.16 6 The other
grounds are stated in substantial conformity with existing law.
The provisions for recusation of the district attorney largely
follow existing procedures, codifying some rules which were
formerly found only in the jurisprudence. For example, the first
ground for recusation, stated in article 680, is "personal interest
in the cause which is in conflict with fair and impartial admin-
istration of justice." (Emphasis added.) This conforms with
the jurisprudence, and is much clearer than the former ground
which was stated as "personal interest adverse to that of the
prosecution." (Emphasis added.) A district attorney who is
overzealous in the prosecution because he was engaged to sue
the defendant in a civil action is fully as undesirable as one
whose personal interests are adverse to the prosecution.1 6 7
165. LA. R.S. 28:96.1 B (Supp. 1966), which continues the effectiveness of
art. 267 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.
166. Accord, ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 250 (1930). ALI Commentary
lists the U. S. Judicial Code and nineteen states as having statutes making
prejudice a ground for recusation of the judge.
167. Canon 5 of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS states: "The
primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to
see that justice is done."
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TITLE XXIII. DISMISSAL OF PROSECUTION
The provisions of this title continue, under a more usual and
descriptive name but without major change, the nolle prosequi
authority of the district attorney. Article 691 continues the dis-
cretionary power of the district attorney to dismiss prosecutions
on his own motion, without obtaining consent of the court.168
An added requirement that the dismissal be entered on the
minutes of the court follows the ALl Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 169 and provides a public record of the district attorney's
exercise of his dismissal authority.
The district attorney's authority to dismiss an indictment,
when a trial de novo has been ordered in the district court after
appeal from a city court conviction, is stated in article 692(2).
This provision is new, but is a logical implementation of the
district attorney's authority to determine which cases he will
prosecute. The same considerations which support the district
attorney's authority to dismiss grand jury indictments which
are not supported by sufficient proof, justify his authority to
dismiss unfounded city court convictions which would not stand
upon a retrial in the district court.
There are certain limitations as to the scope of the trial
de novo on the appeal of a city court conviction to the district
court. The sentence imposed by the city court cannot be in-
creased,'7 0 and only evidence presented in the city court may be
presented at the district court trial.'' In view of these limita-
tions, article 693 (2) logically provides that if the district attor-
ney dismisses the charge appealed, he may not institute the
prosecution again with a new charge. Thus the dismissal of the
appeal operates, in practical effect, as an acquittal.
TITLE XXIV. PROCEDURES PRIOR TO TRIAL
The motion to suppress evidence provides a practical device
for testing, in advance of trial, the validity of evidence and of
written confessions. Paragraph A provides for the suppression
of evidence procured by "an unconstitutional search or seizure."
By this general statement the provision is tailored to fit future
determinations of the Louisiana and United States Supreme
168. Accord, former LA. R.S. 15:329 (1950).
169. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 295 (1930).
170. State v. Debose, 235 La. 875, 106 So. 2d 294 (1958).
171. LA. CONST. art. VIi, § 36, as amended in 1958.
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Courts as to. what is constitutional. The Comment states that
"the term 'unconstitutional,' rather than the term 'illegal' is
employed on the theory that a search or seizure can be 'illegal'
if some minor aspect of search or seizure, or of the search war-
rant or arrest involved, was technically contrary to law even if
not violative of Fourteenth Amendment 'due process' concepts
as expressed by the Mapp case. Use of the more limited term
'unconstitutional,' also conforms with the Louisiana Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Mapp requirements in State v.
James (citation omitted) .' 172 Paragraph A, being similar to
Federal Rule 41 (c), limits the time for filing the motion to sup-
press, but relaxes the time requirement where defense counsel
did not have an opportunity to file it earlier or was unaware of
the ground. Also, the court is given general discretionary au-
thority to entertain a belated motion to suppress.
Paragraph B goes further than the federal rule and author-
izes a motion to suppress a written confession in advance of
trial. This provision does not embrace oral confessions, which
will be governed by existing rules of the jurisprudence. Although
the motion to suppress a written confession must be filed at least
three judicial days before trial, the failure to file a timely motion
to suppress will not prevent objection to the admissibility of the
confession at the trial on the merits.
Article 702 states that cases "shall" be set for trial on motion
of the state, thus preserving the district attorney's general au-
thority to control the docket. 7 3 The further provision that cases
"may" (discretionary) be set for trial on motion of the defend-
ant conforms with the jurisprudential rule that the state's right
to control the docket cannot affect the defendant's right to a
speedy trial.7 4 After the case is set for arraignment or for
trial, the court is in control as to postponements, and the con-
tinuance provisions of the Code'7 5 apply. Continuance procedures
substantially conform with the former law, with the granting
of a continuance being "within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. ' 170 Article 713 adds the sound rule that a continuance
must be granted when requested by both the state and the de-
172. Comment (b) to Art. 703.
173. See Comment (a) to Art. 702.
174. State v. Frith, 194 La. 508, 194 So. 1 (1940).
175. Arts. 707-715.
176. Art. 712.
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fendant. This "negates the idea that when both parties agree to
a continuance the court may nevertheless refuse it."'17 7
TITLE XXV. COMPULSORY PROCESS
The provisions of this title, which implement the defendant's
constitutional right to compulsory process, 7 8 continue and elabo-
rate upon existing statutory procedures. There was no legisla-
tion authorizing use of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal
matters. Article 732 fills this gap without including the broad
discovery procedures of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Some changes, based on considerations of expediency
and fairness, have been made in the rules governing the number
of witnesses who may be summoned at the expense of the parish.
The Comments accompanying these articles 17 9 fully explain the
nature of, and reasons for, these changes. The Uniform Act pro-
visions for obtaining witnesses from outside the state 80 are in-
corporated in the new Code without change, thus avoiding pos-
sible conflict with this uniform legislation as adopted in other
states.
TITLE XXVI. TRIAL PROCEDURE
Article 765, which states the normal order of trial, is not
limited to jury trials. Orderly and predictable proceedings are
desirable in all trials. 8 1 This article continues the existing re-
quirement of an opening statement by the district attorney.
Article 769 codifies a well-settled rule, developed in the juris-
prudence, that the district attorney is bound by his opening
statement. It provides "evidence not fairly within the scope of
the opening statement . .. shall not be admitted in evidence."
This rule is modified, in the interest of avoiding a technical bar
to the full presentation of the facts of the case, to authorize
the court to admit evidence inadvertently and in good faith
omitted from the opening statement. The admission of such evi-
dence is in the discretion of the trial judge and is dependent upon
a finding that the defendant will not be taken by surprise or
prejudiced in his defense.
177. See Comment (a) to Art. 713.
178. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. It was unnecessary to retain former La. R.S.
15:144 and 15:145, which merely restated the constitutional guaranty.
179. Arts. 738-740.
180. Arts. 741-745.
181. Cf. former La. R.S. 15:333 was apparently limited to jury trials; while
the comparable article of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1632, applies both
to jury trials and to judge tried cases.
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Articles 767 and 768 present an entirely new approach to the
problem of reference to confessions in the opening statement.
The defendant cannot properly prepare to meet the issue unless
he is apprised of the state's intention to use the confession. The
making of a sufficient, but not overly detailed, reference to the
confession has raised some close opening-statement problems.
From the defendant's standpoint, substantial damage has been
done when the jury has been told that the defendant made a
confession which later proved inadmissible. The new procedure
solves both of these problems. Article 767 prohibits any refer-
ence to a confession or inculpatory statement in the district
attorney's opening statement. Article 768 requires the state to
advise the defense of its intention to introduce the confession
in writing prior to the opening statement, thus satisfying the
notice requirement even more fully than reference in the opening
statement would do. Failure to give such notice, even though
there may have been a prior ruling on a motion to suppress, will
render the confession inadmissible in evidence.182
A troublesome problem has existed as to prejudicial remarks
made before the jury. Great uncertainty has prevailed as to
when the effect of such remarks can be cured by a prompt
admonition to disregard the remark or comment and when the
remark or comment is so damaging that it is incurable and a
mistrial must be declared. Article 770, which follows existing
lines of the jurisprudence, covers remarks by the court, the
district attorney, or any other court official, which are so highly
prejudicial that they cannot be cured by an admonition. In these
situations the defendant is entitled to a mistrial, unless he pre-
fers that the court admonish the jury and the trial proceed.
Under ground (1), appeals to racial prejudice, there must be a
showing that the remark was immaterial, irrelevant, and of such
a serious nature that it "might create prejudice against the de-
fendant." It thus becomes a matter of degree, as is borne out by
existing jurisprudence, as to whether the intemperate remark
is a ground for a mistrial. Ground (2), proscribing reference
to other crimes of the defendant, expressly excludes reference
to crimes as to which evidence is admissible 83 Grounds (3) and
(4) involve very sensitive areas, where any official reference
is irreparably damaging. Reference to the defendant's failure to
182. See Art. 703, Comment (f).
183. See Comment (c) to Art. 770.
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take the stand, for example, is in derogation of his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.
Article 771 covers irrelevant prejudicial remarks where an
admonition will generally be sufficient. This would include lesser
prejudicial remarks by a district attorney, being those not listed
in article 770. It would embrace any remarks by a spectator or
witness, including remarks of the character included in article
770. Remarks by these persons do not have the same weight as
official utterances by the court or district attorney. Also, these
people cannot be fully controlled and there is not the same of-
ficial responsibility for their utterances. In these situations,
while an admonition is the normal remedy, the trial judge is
authorized to grant a mistrial if the situation is so bad that an
admonition will not assure the defendant of a fair trial.
Article 775 is of particular importance in connection with
double jeopardy, since double jeopardy cannot exist if a mistrial
was properly ordered in the first trial. Existing guidelines as
to the ordering of mistrial were somewhat inadequate, consisting
of a hybrid admixture of statutory and jurisprudential rules.
Article 775 draws these rules together with an enumeration of
those situations in which a mistrial may be ordered and the
jury dismissed. These grounds conform with present standards
and are carefully stated.
The directed verdict is extended to jury trials by article 778,
which follows the federal motion for acquittal.18 4 The motion
may be made either after the close of the state's evidence or after
all evidence is in. It is an extension of the existing rule that
the judge should grant a new trial when "the verdict is contrary
to the law and the evidence."'1 5 It goes further, however, since
the granting of a new trial lacks the finality of an acquittal.
The test for directing a verdict is the same as that enunciated
in the federal motion for acquittal, i.e., "if the evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain a conviction." This test is about as definite
as is possible in this area, and Louisiana courts will be able to
look to federal decisions for some guidance.'8 6 In general, fed-
eral courts appear reluctant to order an acquittal unless the
184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; accord, ALI CODE OF CRIA. PROC. § 321 (1930).
185. Art. 851(1), following former La. R.S. 15:509.
186. For examples of the somewhat divergent views of the federal decisions in
point, see Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1947) and
Knapp v. United States, 311 F. 2d. 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1962).
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prosecution has completely failed to make, out a case against
the defendant."' The discretionary nature of the Louisiana
directed verdict provision for jury trials is clearly shown by the
use of the phrase "may direct a verdict of not guilty" (emphasis
added) in the jury trial provision of article 778. Since the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases
is restricted to "questions of law alone,"'81 9 there will probably
be a very limited review of the trial judge's ruling upon a
motion for a directed verdict. In this regard Supreme Court
decisions concerning the trial judge's refusal to grant a new
trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the law and
the evidence will be of high relevancy.'9 ° Following present fed-
eral and Louisiana guidelines, directed verdicts will be limited
to cases where the failure of proof is clear. In those situations
it will serve a very useful and proper purpose.
Article 800 adopts practical requirements for review of the
trial judge's refusal to sustain a challenge of a juror for cause.
In order to establish probable prejudice by an erroneous ruling
it is only necessary that the defendant exhaust his peremptory
challenges in completing the jury. The provision thus legisla-
tively overrules the additional requirement of State v. Breed-
love' 91 that the defendant must unsuccessfully challenge an addi-
tional juror after his peremptory challenges are exhausted -
thereby affirmatively showing that he is "forced to accept an
obnoxious juror."''1 2 It may be logically assumed that a defend-
ant, who exhausted all his peremptory challenges, had a need
for the peremptory challenge he used to exclude the juror he
unsuccessfully challenged for cause; and it was unfair to require
188. See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 435 (1947).
189. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
190. The judge's refusal to grant a new trial has only been held reversible
error where the court found no evidence or "no probative evidence" in support of
an essential element of the crime. In State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429
(1924), the facts certified by the trial judge showed that the defendant, convicted
of receiving stolen things, really owned them. In State v. Linkletter, 239 La. 1000,
1018, 120 So. 2d 835, 841 (1960) the Supreme Court adopted a rather liberal
attitude as to its appellate jurisdiction in holding that scanty and very tenuous
circumstantial evidence constituted "a total lack of evidence to prove the guilt."
Similarly, in State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So. 2d 11 (1958), the Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that there was "no probative evidence" of an essen-
tial element of the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, i.e., of the require-
ment that the victim was an unmarried female. While not susceptible of a rule of
thumb, the Louisiana Supreme Court decisions have established a fairly under-
standable pattern as to when a refusal to grant a new trial or to direct a verdict
would constitute reversible error.
191. 199 La. 965, 7 So. 2d 221 (1942).
192. See former LA. R.S. 15:353 (1950).
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the defendant to run the risk of prejudicing a juror he is forced
to keep by challenging that juror after his peremptory challenges
are exhausted.
The verdicts chapter generally follows existing rules, but a
few changes are worthy of particular note. Article 810 provides
that the jury verdict shall be written on the back of the list of
responsive verdicts which is given to the jury,193 rather than on
the back of the indictment. Article 816 follows present law, but
clarifies the procedure by expressly stating that, where the de-
fendant has pleaded insanity, a verdict of "not guilty by reason
of insanity" is an added responsive verdict. Thus it must be
included in the written list of responsive verdicts.
TITLE XXVII. PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT
The important requirement in felony trials of the defendant's
presence at every important stage of the proceedings was for-
merly based in part upon the jurisprudence, and partly stated
in specific provisions of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 831 gathers into one provision a statement of the various
steps of the trial during which the defendant's presence is re-
quired - thus providing a clear and more complete statement
of this phase of the law. In general, it conforms with the former
law and covers those situations where the defendant's presence
is of particular significance, either because of the importance
of the determinations being made or because the defense will
be aided by first-hand information from the defendant. The
fourth requirement that the defendant must be present "at all
times . . . when the court is determining and ruling on the
admissibility of evidence," embraces an important stage of the
proceedings which might not have been considered as a "stage
of the trial" under the jurisprudential formula. However, it is
important that the defendant, who best knows the facts and
circumstances, should be present during argument of counsel as
to the admissibility of a confession or other key evidence.
Article 834, which is in line with existing jurisprudence,
states those stages in the criminal proceedings during which
the defendant's presence is not necessary. These stages mainly
involve preliminary motions and post-conviction motions. Pres-
ence of the defendant at pronouncement of sentence is separately
193. Art. 809.
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treated in article 835, since the defendant's absence at sentencing
does not invalidate the trial, but merely requires resentencing
in the defendant's presence. In misdemeanor cases the sen-
tencing rule is liberalized so as to expressly authorize the court
to excuse the defendant from being present when sentence is
pronounced. The former code provision required that all sen-
tences be pronounced in the defendant's presence, 4 a require-
ment that was frequently ignored when a fine was imposed for
a petty offense.
Article 832 provides rules governing waiver of the defend-
ant's right to be present by his temporary, voluntary absence.
The waiver is limited to non-capital cases, thus codifying the
Louisiana and general rule that the defendant's presence at im-
portant stages of the proceedings in a trial for a capital offense
is sacramental and cannot be waived. The general waiver rule
for non-capital cases conforms with a fairly well-settled rule
of the jurisprudence. Questions can arise, of course, as to when
absence is "voluntary" or when it is "temporary," these being
considerations that defy more precise definition.195 It should be
noted that the waiver rule for non-capital felonies only applies
when counsel is present at the time of defendant's absence.
TITLE XXVIII. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
This title conforms with the bill of exceptions provisions of
the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure. It was not considered
feasible to eliminate the bill of exceptions, which is a device for
preserving a complete record of the proceedings or ruling ob-
jected to, until Louisiana has a state-wide procedure for recorda-
tion and transcription of the entire proceedings in all felony
trials. Legislative efforts to achieve this uniformity were un-
successful in 1960, 1962, ,and 1964, so the bill of exceptions was
retained in substantially its present form. A few provisions
have been added in the interest of completeness and trial con-
venience. Paragraph A of article 844 states the well-settled rule
that only formal bills of exceptions, perfected and signed timely
by the trial judge, will be considered on appeal. An exception is
recognized in capital cases, where the appellate court, "to pro-
mote the ends of justice, may consider bills that have not been
194. Former LA. R.S. 15:523 (1950).
195. See art. 832, comment (b).
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timely signed." (Emphasis added.) This codifies the Louisiana
jurisprudence. 1 96
Paragraph B adds legislative sanction to a practical pro-
cedure, where it had been generally felt that special Supreme
Court permission was required. This provision allows evidence
already included in one bill of exceptions to be incorporated by
reference in other bills, thus avoiding unnecessary duplication
of long transcriptions of evidence that is of relevance to several
bills of exceptions. Thus such application is provided for.
Article 845 provides an important liberalization of the rule
as to the procedure for signing bills of exceptions. Under the
1928 code provisions, as interpreted by the jurisprudence, the
defendant lost any bills that were not signed prior to the issuance
of the order of appeal, and it was not possible for the trial judge
to extend the time for presenting bills of exception when he
granted the order of appeal. 1 97 Sometimes, where many bills with
much testimony to be transcribed were to be presented, it was
almost impossible to get them ready in the short time' 98 allowed
for taking an appeal; and this difficulty was even greater when
defense counsel was inexperienced in criminal trial procedures.
Articles 845 and 915A of the new Code afford relief in this
situation by providing that where bills of exceptions are not
perfected prior to the order of appeal the court shall set a later
date for their submission and signing. The limit upon the addi-
tional time for submission of formal bills is the return day for
the appeal. 199
TITLE XXIX. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND IN
ARREST OF JUDGMENT
Both the motion for a new trial and the motion in arrest of
judgment must be filed before sentence. 200 In felony cases the
196. State v. Harrell, 228 La. 434, 82 So. 2d 701 (1955). In capital cases
the Louisiana Supreme Court has been solicitous in not allowing a technicality
to deprive a defendant of review of trial procedures.
. 197. State v. Dartez, 222 La. 9, 12, 62 So. 2d 83, 84 (1952) construing former
R.S. 15 :545 to require that "After an appeal has been granted the trial court is
immediately divested of jurisdiction and any bills filed thereafter and presented
to the judge for his signature and per curiam come too late and cannot be con-
sidered an appeal."
198. Art. 914 increases the time for filing the motion for an appeal from
ten to fifteen days, but the time will still be insufficient for perfecting bills of
exceptions in some complicated cases.
199. Under Art. 919, appeals to the Supreme Court are returnable within not
less than fifteen days and not more than sixty days from the day the order of
appeal is entered.
200. Art. 853 (motion for new trial) ; art. 861 (motion in arrest of judgment).
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mandatory delay (unless waived) between conviction and sen-
tence has been raised from twenty-four hours to three days. 20 1
The longer mandatory delay is to assure the defendant sufficient
time to prepare his motions, especially in cases where an in-
experienced attorney is urging numerous objections to the trial
procedures. This provision conforms with the period prescribed
in a comparable provision of the American Law Institute's Code
of Criminal Procedure.202 Flexibility is provided by the fact that
the three-day delay period may be expressly waived,20 3 and "the
court, on motion of the defendant and for good cause shown,
may postpone the imposition of sentence for a specified period
in order to give the defendant additional time to prepare and
file a motion for a new trial." In misdemeanor cases, where com-
plicated motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment are not
usually filed, no mandatory period for delay in sentencing is
provided. In those exceptional cases where, in order to prepare
post-conviction motions or for some other good reason, a delay
in sentencing is needed, a motion to that effect should be con-
sidered by the trial judge.
The Chapter 1 provisions, which govern motions for new
trial, make no substantial changes in the law. The grounds for a
new trial, and the procedures for asserting them, follow the
1928 code provisions very closely. The most significant im-
provements, but no drastic changes, have been made in connec-
tion with ground (3), newly discovered evidence.20 4 The test
for a new trial on this ground is more realistically and clearly
stated, in conformity with a corresponding provision of the
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure. 20 5 It now
simply requires that the newly discovered evidence would prob-
ably have changed the verdict or judgment if it had been intro-
duced. The former requirement of a showing, under article 511
of the 1928 Code, "that said evidence is not merely cumulative;
that it does not merely corroborate or impeach the credibility or
testimony of any witness examined at the trial" has been a
source of uncertainty,20 6 and is omitted.
201. Art. 873.
202. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 378 (1930).
203. Art. 873.
204. Art. 851, Grounds for new trial.
205. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 364 (1930).
206. It is clear from the jurisprudence that this rule was not without its
exceptions; and the fact that important newly discovered evidence was cumula-
tive would not, standing alone, prevent its being urged as a ground for a new trial.
See, State v. Wynne, 153 La. 414, 417, 96 So. 15, 16 (1923) ; State v. Day, 148
La. 815, 817, 88 So. 76, 77 (1921).
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The second paragraph of Article 853, following a provision
of the American Law Institute's Code, 20 7 gives the defendant a
period of one year in which to file a motion for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence.2 0 8 The extended time
allowed for filing on this ground is desirable because new evi-
dence seldom comes to the defendant's attention within the
normal period for filing the motion for a new trial. While
special liberality is called for, the one year cut-off date recom-
mended by the American Law Institute is desirable. The Re-
porters and their advisors considered, but rejected, the possi-
bility of added time for filing a motion for a new trial on the
ground of a newly discovered error or defect in the proceedings.
It was concluded that such defects, unless they were so grievous
as to assume "due process" significance and to be a ground for
habeas corpus, 20 9 should be urged within the liberalized normal
period for filing a motion for a new trial.
The requirement of article 507 of the 1928 Code that the
proof must correspond with the allegations of the motion for a
new trial is omitted. A new trial should be granted any time the
defendant shows a valid ground therefor, even though by over-
sight or inexperience defense counsel failed to state the ground
in his motion. 210 Liberal provisions for supplementing the mo-
tion for a new trial by including additional grounds are stated
in article 856 of the new Code. The state can be fully protected
by the court's granting of additional time to prepare to meet a
surprise ground that is asserted by the defense.
The specific statement in article 859, of the grounds for a
motion in arrest of judgment, should be an important aid to the
inexperienced defense lawyer and to the new judge. The nebulous
formula of the 1928 Code of "a substantial defect, patent upon
the face of the record,"'2 1, was a source of considerable uncer-
tainty, and its meaning was obtainable only by a careful study
of the jurisprudence. Here, there were some surprise holdings
for the inexperienced attorney, since the so-called "record" does
207. ALI CODE OF CaIn. PRoc. § 362 (1930). The Commentary of the ALI
source provision lists seven states that have statutes providing an extended period
for filing the motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
208. Art. 851(4),
209. Art. 362. It is a ground for discharge of a defendant by habeas corpus
if "ie was convicted without due process of law."
210. The comprehensive new trial provisions of the ALl ConE OF CRIM. PRoc.
§§ 361-368 (1930), do not limit the court's authority to the grounds stated in the
motion.
211. Former LA. R.S. 15:517 (1950).
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not embrace all matters that are transcribed in the minutes of
the court.212 Uncertainty as to the proper use of the motion in
arrest was further illustrated by the many times it was un-
successfully urged when the appropriate remedy was the reser-
vation of a bill of exceptions and a subsequent motion for a
new trial.213 The first five grounds stated in article 859 conform
with the jurisprudence under the general "face of the record"
formula. Grounds (6) and (7), double jeopardy and time limi-
tation upon the institution of prosecution, have been added.
While they would not have met the former test, they are basic
defenses which should not be lost by delay in their assertion.
Double jeopardy is a fundamental defense which is stated in
both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions.2 14 The time
limitation upon the institution of prosecution, which is distin-
guishable from the time limitation upon the commencement of
trial, may be urged at any time ;215 and a motion in arrest is the
proper device for urging it, since the defendant is not seeking a
new trial. Although the defenses of grounds (6) and (7) may
be urged at any stage in the proceedings, they may be urged
only once. Therefore, they may not be urged by a motion in
arrest if previously urged. If such defenses are unsuccessfully
urged by a motion to quash, or during trial, the defendant's
remedy is to reserve a bill of exceptions to the adverse ruling
and proceed to appellate review by that route.
No generalized rule is possible as to the effect of sustaining
a motion in arrest of judgment. Under article 862, which con-
forms with existing jurisprudence, disposition of the defendant,
when a motion in arrest is sustained, varies with the ground for
the motion. Where the conviction is set aside because of defec-
tive procedures in the present trial,210 such as a defective in-
dictment or the wrong type of tribunal, the defendant is subject
to another trial upon a valid indictment or before the appro-
priate type of tribunal. Some grounds for a motion in arrest
are fundamental defenses that will serve as a complete bar to
any further trial. These are invalidity of the statute the defend-
212. State v. Daleo, 179 La. 516, 154 So. 437 (1934), holding that the judge's
written charge could not be the basis of a motion in arrest; State v. Knight, 227
La. 739, 80 So. 2d 391 (1955), holding that the written list of verdicts given the
jury was not a matter of record.
213. See art. 859," comment (a), third paragraph.
214. U. S. CONST. amend. V; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
215. Art. 577.
216. See Art. 859, grounds (1), (3), (4), and (5).
[Vol. XXVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ant was charged to have violated, double jeopardy and that the
prosecution was not timely instituted. When a judgment is ar-
rested on one of these grounds21 the defendant will be com-
pletely discharged.
TITLE XXX. SENTENCE
Generally, this title does not make drastic changes in sen-
tencing procedures. Most of the new provisions either codify
present practices or supply deficiencies in the law. It should
be noted, as pointed out in the last paragraph of Comment (b)
of Article 871, which states the procedures for pronouncing and
recording sentence, that "the requirements of this article, as well
as other rules stated in this code, do not preclude or interfere
with the adoption of special informal procedures for receiving
pleas of guilty before traffic violations bureaus. ' 218
The requirement of article 874 that sentence shall be im-
posed "without unreasonable delay" is taken from Federal Rule
32 (a) .219 An attempt to be specific as to the time within which
sentence must be imposed would have presented difficulty in
view of the wide variety of circumstances which enter into the
sentencing process. Valuable guides as to the "unreasonable
delay" formula are available in federal jurisprudence. In one
case the trial court lost jurisdiction to pass sentence by indefi-
nite postponement for a period of approximately three years
(five terms) .220 Except in very extreme cases, however, the
federal courts have displayed a marked tendency to find con-
sent to the delay by the defendant's failure to move for sentence,
or to find that the delay was justified.22 1 The provision for dis-
cretionary supervisory writs, rather than a right of appeal,
should serve to avoid clogging the Supreme Court docket with
frivolous appeals on claims of unreasonable delay in sentencing.
Article 880 is based on a recent federal sentencing statute222
which authorizes the sentencing judge to allow credit for time
spent in actual custody pending trial and sentence. There was
no authority, under the 1928 code, to give a convicted defend-
ant credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial and sentencing
217. See Art. 862, last paragraph, and comment (e).
218. Art. 15, see comments (c) and (d).
219. Accord, ILL. CODE OF CRIAM. PROC. § 118-1 (1964).
220. Mintie v. Biddle, 15 F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1926).
221. See Art. 874, comment (b).
222. 18 U.S.C. §3568 (1960).
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and some confusion had resulted. Judges would frequently take
pre-sentence detention into consideration and impose a lighter
sentence, but they could not legally impose a regular sentence
and give credit for prior custody. 2 3 Article 880 permits a real-
istic and direct approach in which the judge imposes an appro-
priate sentence and expressly gives the defendant credit for his
pre-sentence incarceration. Similarly, article 913 provides that
where the defendant is held in jail pending his appeal the court
"may" amend the sentence to "grant credit for all or a part of
the time served pending the appeal."
Article 883 continues the sentencing judge's general author-
ity to determine whether multiple sentences are to be served
concurrently or consecutively. The judge's intent in this regard
is frequently unexpressed, or may be expressed in a very con-
fusing way.224 If the court does not expressly direct whether the
sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively, this
article provides the rule of construction. If the sentences are
for related offenses such as a burglary and an incidental rob-
bery, the sentences will run concurrently. 225 Conversely, if the
convictions are for offenses which did not arise out of the same
criminal transaction or scheme, it is less likely that concurrent
sentences were intended, and the article provides that such sen-
tences, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, are to be
served consecutively.
Article 884, in conformity with a procedure widely employed
by other states, and former miscellaneous Louisiana provi-
sions, 226 directs the court to impose an alternate prison sentence,
as a means of enforcing a sentence of a fine or costs. It fol-
lows former R.S. 15:529.3 in limiting the maximum prison term
to one year, and providing that the default sentence of imprison-
ment shall be specified in the original sentence. It would be im-
practical to require that the defendant be brought back into
court, after his default, for imposition of the prison sentence.
Article 890 provides a clearer and more complete statement
of the method of serving jail sentences. There was no need for
rules in the Code with respect to sentences of imprisonment in
223. Salisbury v. Raines, 365 P.2d 568 (Okla. App. 1961).
224. "One of the knottiest questions of criminal procedure is how to tell when
sentences are concurrent and when they are consecutive." ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 575 (1947).
225. Accord, ALI CODE OF CRiM. PROC. § 402 (1930).
226. See Comments to Art. 884, summarizing the former statutory provisions.
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the state penitentiary, since this is fully provided for in general
statutes governing prisons, which are retained unchanged in
Title 15 of the Revised Statutes . 2 7
Louisiana's suspended sentence and probation laws were re-
vised in 1960, by the Parolee Rehabilitation Committee, in the
light of recent developments in this important field. The 1960
statute, 228 which had been carefully considered by a strong panel
of judges and prison administrators, served as the basis for the
"Suspended Sentence and Probation" chapter of Title XXX.
A few changes, made in the interest of more effective adminis-
tration of suspended sentence and probation, will be briefly
noted.
Article 894, providing for suspension of sentence in mis-
demeanor cases, expressly authorizes the court to suspend the
execution of "the whole or any part of the sentence imposed."
Flexibility is desirable to enable the sentencing judge to adjust
the sentence to the exigencies of the case at hand. For example,
it frequently may be advisable to release a defendant for a short
time when he is needed at home by reason of his wife's illness
or some other emergency. The authority to suspend sentence
had been construed as requiring the suspension of the entire
sentence or full remainder, and as not permitting suspension
of part of a sentence of imprisonment.2 2 9 Regardless of the term
of the sentence imposed, which may be for a short period of
twenty or thirty days, the suspension of sentence "during good
behavior" is generally fixed at one year. Since the defendant
is relieved of actual incarceration, it is reasonable to hold him
to "good behavior," which is defined to mean non-criminal be-
havior, for a substantial period of time. The court may, if it so
desires, specify a shorter period than one year for the sus-
pended sentence.
Commission of another felony while a defendant is on pro-
bation for a felony, or of any offense when a defendant is under
a suspended misdemeanor sentence, is such a serious matter
that it will ordinarily result in revocation of the probation or
suspended sentence. Article 901 clears up uncertainty in the
jurisprudence, resulting from incompleteness of the statute law,
as to subsequent criminal convictions as a ground for revocation
227. See Art. 890, comment (a).
228. LA. Acts 1960, No. 360.
229. State v. Johnson, 220 La. 64, 55 So. 2d 782 (1951) ; Cox v. Brown, 211
La. 235, 29 So. 2d 776 (1947).
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of probation in felony cases. Under existing jurisprudence, ap-
plying former R.S. 15:538 (a misdemeanor provision) to fel-
ony probations,23 0 it would have been possible to revoke a felony
probation and subject the defendant to a long prison term for
the sole reason that he committed some petty misdemeanor.
There will be cases where abstinence from commission of cer-
tain types of misdemeanors will be staied conditions of the pro-
bation, but application of the general "good behavior" mis-
demeanor formula to felony probations could result in some
harsh results.
TITLE XXXI. APPEAL
Article 912 continues the existing general concept that "only
a final judgment or ruling is appealable," but then goes further
and provides a list of the rulings or judgments which are ap-
pealable by the state or by the defendant. The list was prepared
in conformity with existing Louisiana jurisprudence and sought
to include all possible situations. However, appealable judgments
and rulings "include, but are not limited to," those which are
listed. In the event that a judgment which should be appeal-
able is not included among those listed, "the court has the dis-
cretion and the power to allow an appeal if the basic test of
finality is satisfied." 231 Judgments appealable by the state, for
example, would include the sustaining of any motion that finally
kills the prosecution. In general, the defendant's appeal is lim-
ited to appeal from a judgment which imposes sentence. 2- 2 The
defendant's normal remedy as to adverse preliminary rulings
is to preserve his right of appeal by reserving a bill of excep-
tions and then proceeding with the trial. In exceptional situa-
tions, such as when an order declaring the defendant presently
incapable of standing trial and committing him to a mental
institution has been issued, the order is final as to the issue
involved and the defendant is given a right to appeal. Article
912 purports to authorize an appeal, by the state and by the
defendant, from an extradition ruling. This authorization will
probably be ineffective in view of Extradition Proceedings v.
Palmer233 and the Reporters plan to have this authorization re-
230. State ex rel. Waggoner v. Cozart, 222 La. 1039, 64 So. 2d 424 (1953)
State v. Lucas, 225 La. 27, 71 So. 2d 870 (1954).
231. See Art. 912, comment (a).
232. This is in conformity with the Louisiana jurisprudence. See Art. 912,
comment (c).
233. 240 La. 784, 125 So. 2d 164 (1960).
[Vol. XXVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
considered and probably deleted. In the meantime it would be
advisable to either continue the former remedy of applying for
writs, or to simultaneously take an appeal and apply for writs.
Article 913 makes a change as to the effect of appeals by
the state. Under former R.S. 15:539 all appeals were suspen-
sive. This apparently required that when the state appealed
from a judgment calling for the defendant's discharge, the de-
fendant, except in those cases where bail was possible, had to
remain in jail. New article 913A continues the general pattern
of suspensive appeals, but makes an exception "when the ruling
or judgment [appealed from] requires the release of the de-
fendant." Thus, an appeal from a ruling arresting judgment
on a ground requiring the defendant's release, such as uncon-
stitutionality of the statute he was prosecuted under, double
jeopardy, or time limitation on the institution of prosecution, 234
would not be suspensive and the defendant would be released
pending appeal..2 35
Bail pending appeal from felony convictions is very limit-
ed.283 Thus article 913B appropriately authorizes the trial court,
when a defendant has been held in jail pending his unsuccessful
appeal, "to grant credit for all or a part of the time served
pending the appeal."
Article 914 increases the time for filing a motion for an
appeal from ten to fifteen days. This is in recognition of the
fact that the former ten-day period was inadequate.
Article 920, defining the scope of appellate review, provides
rules which eliminate unnecessary technical requirements. Para-
graph (1) continues and clearly states the rule that formal bills
of exceptions can be reviewed even if they have not been made
a ground for a motion for a new trial.2 37 Paragraph (2) elimi-
nates the cumbersome assignment of error procedure, and gen-
erally authorizes the Supreme Court to consider any errors "dis-
coverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceed-
ings and without inspection of the evidence." This formula was
taken from former R.S. 15:503, which defined an error "patent
on the face of the record." The main advantage of the new pro-
234. Art. 859(2), (6), (7), and art. 862, last paragraph.
235. See Art. 913, comment (a).
236. Art. 314, Bail after conviction.
237. The requirement of a motion for a new trial was in former LA. R.S.
15:559 (1950), which was repealed by LA. Acts 1964, No. 516.
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cedure is to eliminate the time limit for filing an assignment
of errors. The Comment to this provision states that the time
limit "was unfair, because if an error is patent on the face of
the record, the appellate court should be able to consider it at
any time ... and if the opposing party is surprised by the rais-
ing of the new issue, it is a simple matter to grant a continu-
ance."
238
Article 921 retaius the important "harmless error" provision
of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.2 1 9 This provision was
continued with all its sacramental language intact, for it has
been given a well-understood and meaningful application by the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The aim of this provision, which was
originally proposed by a committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, was to limit reversals to cases where the error com-
plained of probably had a substantial effect upon the outcome
of the trial. As was very aptly pointed out in State v. Saia,240
appeals are not granted merely to test the correctness of the
trial judge's ruling, but only to rectify probable injury caused
thereby.
CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article to point up the most
important changes effected in the various titles of the new Code
of Criminal Procedure. It is hoped that interested members of
the Bar, and this means almost everyone since Gideon v. Wain-
wright, will use these explanations as a starting point for a
detailed study of the procedures with which they are most con-
cerned. When they do, I feel confident that the inexperienced
defense counsel will find the new code easier to work with than
the former hodge-podge of statutory rules, judicial decisions and
local ad hoc procedures. It is also hoped that the new code will
provide workable tools for our courts, district attorneys, and
experienced defense lawyers. An attempt has been made to pro-
vide sound rules, stripped of technical requirements which might
unnecessarily shackle the defense, the state, or the court.
238. See Art. 920, comment (d).
239. LA. R.S. 15:557 (1950).
240. 212 La. 868, 33 So. 2d 665 (1947). See Art. 921, comment (c).
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